CLAWSTIN MORNING PAPER — 2026-03-19

Thursday, 2026-03-19

TRADING DASHBOARD

TRADING P&L DASHBOARD — Daily target: $10/day
Track Today Total P&L Notes
📈 Agent Trader $+0.00 $-9.84 Swing, public.com
🎲 Polymarket — $+0.00 Structural arb, slow
Net (after tax + costs) $-0.10 vs $10 target: $-10.10

Cost breakdown: tax 37% short-term ($0.00) + token spend ($0.10/day) | Go-live trigger: 5 consecutive profitable weeks in paper trading

INNOVATIONS

RESEARCHER

Researcher Report — 2026-03-19

Run time: 2026-03-19 01:03 ET

Phase 1: Tech Research


Sources scanned: 694 items across HN + RSS feeds Candidates after scoring: 15 CBL evaluated: 15

EAT (queued to fridge)

- [EAT] RAMP: Reinforcement Adaptive Mixed Precision Quantization for Efficient On Device LLM Inference — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] ZipServ: Fast and Memory-Efficient LLM Inference with Hardware-Aware Lossless Compression — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] QFT: Quantized Full-parameter Tuning of LLMs with Affordable Resources — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] Claude Code Security and Magecart: Getting the Threat Model Right — _✅ queued_

HOLD (notable but not fridged)

- [HOLD] PhysQuantAgent: An Inference Pipeline of Mass Estimation for Vision-Language Models — - [HOLD] Differential Privacy in Generative AI Agents: Analysis and Optimal Tradeoffs — - [HOLD] Generalist Multimodal LLMs Gain Biometric Expertise via Human Salience — - [HOLD] Anonymous-by-Construction: An LLM-Driven Framework for Privacy-Preserving Text — - [HOLD] KANtize: Exploring Low-bit Quantization of Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks for Efficient Inference — - _(and 5 more HOLD items)_

Phase 2: PaperTrader Experiments


_No snapshot data available for today._

Phase 2 Errors

- ⚠️ No snapshot for today — cannot analyze performance

Phase 3: Optimization Analysis


> _Stale files and cron health are auditor territory (autoaudit). This phase covers cost and model routing only._

Cost Optimization Suggestions


- bizbot (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run - agent-trader-premarket (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run

Cost Optimization Opportunities


- Opus referenced in 32 mentions across 23 sessions (46% of model refs) → Review Opus-heavy sessions — most tasks could run on Sonnet at ~10x lower cost _Up to ~10x on affected calls_ - Researcher used only $0.0278 of $5.00 cap (1% utilization) → Consider reducing budget_cap_usd or adding more Phase 1/2 analysis depth _N/A — currently under-utilized_


Phase 4: ClawHub Skill Scan



34 suspicious skill(s): - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a brand-new account (published 2026-01-26), no visible source code repository linked, vague description that lists capabilities without implementation details, and requests broad network/filesystem access (web search, crawling, company research) that could enable data exfiltration or unauthorized access. - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-hass — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-10), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access to Home Assistant instances (potential lateral movement vector), (4) MCP protocol implementation from unknown author with no community validation.
If this were to be considered: would be relevant to homelab/automation projects, but requires source code review and verification of MCP protocol implementation before any approval. - [SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-plugin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads on new account (2026-02-02), no visible source code repository, vague description that doesn't specify actual MCP server implementations or security controls, requests broad network/filesystem access ("external tools and data sources"), and the description reads as agent-directed instructions ("Enable AI agents to discover and execute tools"). - [SUSPICIOUS] atlassian-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple critical red flags: (1) Zero downloads + brand new account (2026-01-25), (2) No visible source code provided, (3) Requests Docker execution + filesystem access + network access to external Atlassian services, (4) Vague on actual implementation details, (5) Description reads partially as agent-directed instructions ("Use when you need to..."), (6) Requires sensitive API credentials with no transparency on how they're handled.
Not recommended for installation without source code audit and author verification. - [SUSPICIOUS] clickup-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-01-06), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests OAuth authentication + network access to external service, (4) New/unestablished author account, (5) Description reads as direct instructions to an AI agent ("Manage ClickUp tasks...via official MCP"). - [SUSPICIOUS] glin-profanity-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + brand new account (published 2026-02-01), no visible source code repository linked, vague technical details about implementation, and description reads as instructions directed at an AI system ("Use when reviewing batches of user content, AI needs content moderation capabilities during workflows"). - [SUSPICIOUS] xiaohongshu-mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-28), no visible source code, vague truncated description suggesting network/process spawning capabilities ("Operate Xiaohongshu via local MCP service"), and the skill requests interaction with external social media platform (potential data exfiltration vector). - [SUSPICIOUS] wordpress-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-10), no visible source code repository linked, vague permission requirements ("Requires AI Engine plugin"), and description reads partially as agent instructions ("Use for creating/editing posts...when asked about WordPress site management") rather than pure technical documentation.
Not relevant to active projects (mcp/automation/homelab/raspberry pi/trading/react native/ios/signal/openclaw/agent/cli/monitoring). - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-client — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-22), no visible source code accessible for review, vague description lacking implementation details, and MCP client skills inherently request network access and process spawning capabilities which require elevated trust verification. - [SUSPICIOUS] arc-security-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple critical red flags: zero downloads with new account (2026-02-17), vague description lacking technical specifics or source code reference, claims 743+ findings without verifiable audit trail or methodology transparency, and the description reads like marketing copy rather than technical documentation—classic patterns of unvetted security tooling that could introduce supply chain risk. - [SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-06, author JK-0001), no visible source code repository linked, and vague description that doesn't specify actual implementation details, permissions, or dependencies required for the claimed tool integrations (Zapier, Make, n8n). - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-20), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access and process spawning capabilities ("multi-browser support", "scheduled jobs"), (4) Vague technical details about implementation and security controls, (5) Author account "arthasking123" shows no verification history. - [SUSPICIOUS] agentic-workflow-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-26) + vague truncated description + "agent" and "workflow automation" keywords appear designed to match this evaluation's own project list + no visible source code repository linked + author handle "0x-Professor" suggests obfuscation. - [SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-business-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + brand new account (published 2026-02-13), no visible source code referenced, description is directive text aimed at an AI agent ("Turn your AI agent into..."), vague implementation claims ("no n8n or Zapier required" without technical details on how), and requests broad cross-functional permissions (sales, ops, finance, HR, support access patterns). - [SUSPICIOUS] data-automation-service — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-19), (2) No visible source code referenced, (3) Vague description lacking technical specifics about API integrations and permissions required, (4) Requests broad "data source API" access without detailing which APIs or what data access is needed.
Not relevant to active projects (does not match: mcp, homelab, raspberry pi, trading, react native, ios, signal, openclaw, agent, cli, monitoring keywords).
** - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-workflow — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-03-06), vague description lacking technical specifics or source code visibility, and no clear disclosure of permissions/dependencies required for n8n/Zapier workflow deployment.
Not relevant to active projects (mcp, homelab, trading, react native, ios, signal, openclaw, agent, cli, monitoring). - [SUSPICIOUS] automation-tool — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publish date (2026-03-08), vague description in Chinese offering "batch generation" with no source code visibility, and the generic nature suggests potential for misuse in automated content spam or manipulation. - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-consulting — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-03-14, author yang1002378395-cmyk with no track record), vague description offering generic "AI automation consulting" with no visible source code or technical implementation details, and the description reads as marketing copy directed at potential users rather than technical documentation of skill functionality. - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-ceo-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a newly created account (2026-02-28), vague description without technical specifics, likely requests broad system permissions for "fully automated company operations," and the description reads as a directive to an AI system rather than technical documentation. - [SUSPICIOUS] homelab-cluster — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) vague description lacking technical specifics about implementation, (3) no visible source code repository linked, (4) "expert MoE routing" and "health monitoring" suggest process spawning and network access capabilities that require explicit vetting, (5) description reads more like marketing copy than technical documentation. - [SUSPICIOUS] homeserver — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-23); (2) Requests network access (port scanning, SSH to multiple servers, WoL), filesystem access outside workspace, and process spawning (Docker management, CLI execution); (3) No visible source code provided; (4) Vague on security/authentication model for multi-server SSH access.
This skill requests dangerous capabilities (arbitrary process execution, network scanning, remote SSH) with no code visibility and unverified author trustworthiness. - [SUSPICIOUS] pi-admin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads combined with very recent publication (2026-01-14), no visible source code mentioned, and the skill requests system-level access (resource monitoring, service management, updates) which requires filesystem and process spawning permissions outside typical workspace constraints—standard attack surface for malicious Pi administration tools. - [SUSPICIOUS] pi-health — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple red flags: zero downloads combined with a very recent publication date (2026-02-09, which is future-dated and anomalous), no visible source code repository linked, the description is directive in nature ("Use when monitoring..."), and it requests privileged system access (CPU temperature, throttling, voltage levels, fan RPM) which requires either root execution or special permissions on a Raspberry Pi—standard attack vectors for privilege escalation. - [SUSPICIOUS] 0x0-messenger — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-23), new/unknown author account, vague description lacking technical implementation details, requests P2P messaging capability that implies network access permissions, and description is written as feature marketing rather than technical specification—all consistent with untrusted external content patterns. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-12), no visible source code repository linked, vague description lacks implementation details, and requesting financial/trading advice skills from untrusted external source raises safety concerns around potential misuse or social engineering. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-devbox — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication (2026-02-25), no visible source code repository linked, vague description that could mask arbitrary code execution, and the description itself reads as a directive to an AI agent ("User describes trading intent in natural language, agent writes...") rather than documenting what the skill actually does/requires. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-brain — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads from new author, vague description lacking technical details, requests to "load" and "guide" (potential code execution), no visible source code, and the framing "Load Travis's personal trading strategy" suggests executing undisclosed logic rather than transparent functionality. - [SUSPICIOUS] quant-trading-system — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-03-08, author "pikachu022700"), no visible source code mentioned, vague description lacking implementation details, and "trading" keyword relevance is ambiguous without clarification on whether this supports active projects. - [SUSPICIOUS] openmm-grid-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-25), no visible source code accessible for vetting, requests financial/trading automation capabilities that require strict security validation, and vague description lacking implementation details or safety mechanisms. - [SUSPICIOUS] kalshi-cli-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple red flags: zero downloads with a very recent publish date (2026-03-04), no visible source code repository linked, requests to execute external `kalshi-cli` command-line tools (process spawning + network access to financial trading platform), vague description truncated mid-sentence, and the author "lacymorrow" appears to be a new/unvetted account.
Project relevance: Would theoretically match "cli" and "automation" keywords, but the security risks outweigh any potential utility. - [SUSPICIOUS] auto-trading-strategy — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a new account (2026-03-13), vague description without technical specifics or source code visibility, and the trading/crypto domain creates financial risk liability if the skill contains flawed or manipulative guidance. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-software-efficiency — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple red flags: zero downloads with a very recent publish date (2026-03-16), no visible source code repository linked, vague description lacking technical implementation details, and the description is directed at end-users rather than documenting actual skill functionality—combined with the future publish date suggesting metadata manipulation. - [SUSPICIOUS] gate-exchange-trading-copilot — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple red flags: zero downloads with a future publish date (2026-03-14, likely a data error), vague truncated description ending mid-sentence, requests financial/trading capabilities requiring network access to external exchange APIs, no visible source code repository, and the author is the exchange itself (potential bundled malware vector). - [SUSPICIOUS] finance-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads, newly published (2026-03-17), no visible source code repository link, requests network access (trading API calls), and vague implementation details without transparency on dependencies or permissions.

Budget Summary


Total spent: $0.0280 / $5.00 cap API calls: 50 Tokens: 18788 input + 3234 output
| Model | Input | Output | Cost | Note | |-------|-------|--------|------|------| | claude-haiku-4-5 | 245 | 29 | $0.000312 | CBL:RAMP: Reinforcement Adaptive Mixed P | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 238 | 27 | $0.000298 | CBL:PhysQuantAgent: An Inference Pipelin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 239 | 19 | $0.000267 | CBL:Differential Privacy in Generative A | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 242 | 29 | $0.000310 | CBL:Generalist Multimodal LLMs Gain Biom | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 241 | 25 | $0.000293 | CBL:Anonymous-by-Construction: An LLM-Dr | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 27 | $0.000306 | CBL:KANtize: Exploring Low-bit Quantizat | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 240 | 24 | $0.000288 | CBL:MLlm-DR: Towards Explainable Depress | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 239 | 23 | $0.000283 | CBL:SO-Bench: A Structural Output Evalua | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 250 | 22 | $0.000288 | CBL:Tabular LLMs for Interpretable Few-S | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 247 | 28 | $0.000310 | CBL:ZipServ: Fast and Memory-Efficient L | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 241 | 29 | $0.000309 | CBL:QFT: Quantized Full-parameter Tuning | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 242 | 19 | $0.000270 | CBL:Post-Training Local LLM Agents for L | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 246 | 23 | $0.000289 | CBL:Noticing the Watcher: LLM Agents Can | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 249 | 21 | $0.000283 | CBL:Claude Code Security and Magecart: G | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 24 | $0.000294 | CBL:Graph-Native Cognitive Memory for AI | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 418 | 80 | $0.000654 | ClawHub:mcp-skill | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 407 | 106 | $0.000750 | ClawHub:mcp-hass | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 79 | $0.000665 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-plugin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 468 | 120 | $0.000854 | ClawHub:atlassian-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 90 | $0.000693 | ClawHub:clickup-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 450 | 70 | $0.000640 | ClawHub:glin-profanity-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 449 | 78 | $0.000671 | ClawHub:xiaohongshu-mcp-skill | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 476 | 106 | $0.000805 | ClawHub:wordpress-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 404 | 60 | $0.000563 | ClawHub:mcp-client | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 432 | 80 | $0.000666 | ClawHub:arc-security-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 495 | 74 | $0.000692 | ClawHub:automation-workflows | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 91 | $0.000700 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 506 | 70 | $0.000685 | ClawHub:automation-workflows-0-1-0 | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 72 | $0.000631 | ClawHub:agentic-workflow-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 439 | 93 | $0.000723 | ClawHub:afrexai-business-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 431 | 120 | $0.000825 | ClawHub:data-automation-service | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 492 | 88 | $0.000746 | ClawHub:ai-automation-workflow | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 60 | $0.000571 | ClawHub:automation-tool | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 441 | 79 | $0.000669 | ClawHub:ai-automation-consulting | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 401 | 67 | $0.000589 | ClawHub:ai-ceo-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 87 | $0.000676 | ClawHub:homelab-cluster | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 424 | 120 | $0.000819 | ClawHub:homeserver | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 405 | 74 | $0.000620 | ClawHub:pi-admin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 466 | 104 | $0.000789 | ClawHub:pi-health | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 428 | 76 | $0.000646 | ClawHub:0x0-messenger | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 409 | 63 | $0.000579 | ClawHub:trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 413 | 80 | $0.000650 | ClawHub:trading-devbox | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 67 | $0.000599 | ClawHub:trading-brain | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 404 | 67 | $0.000591 | ClawHub:quant-trading-system | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 58 | $0.000565 | ClawHub:openmm-grid-trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 120 | $0.000821 | ClawHub:kalshi-cli-trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 63 | $0.000580 | ClawHub:auto-trading-strategy | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 73 | $0.000633 | ClawHub:trading-software-efficiency | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 431 | 79 | $0.000661 | ClawHub:gate-exchange-trading-copilot | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 51 | $0.000546 | ClawHub:finance-trading |

AUTO AUDIT RESULTS

AUTOAUDIT Summary -- 2026-03-19


Findings


CRITICAL


1. Gmail OAuth tokens expired — BOTH accounts. `adalsey` and `krspamgang` tokens revoked. Continuous hourly failures from 2026-03-17 through 2026-03-19 03:00 (14+ logged errors). Smoke test confirms: `gmail-adalsey` FAIL, `gmail-krspamgang` FAIL (`invalid_grant: Token has been expired or revoked`). LaunchAgents `clawstin.gmail.triage` and `clawstin.gmail.triage-krspamgang` both exit 1. Last successful triage: adalsey 78.7h ago, krspamgang 42.3h ago. Root cause: Google Cloud project likely in "Testing" publishing status → 7-day refresh token expiry. adalsey: 9th consecutive audit. krspamgang: 2nd consecutive.

WARNING


2. Context load: 2,280 words (threshold: 1,500). AGENTS.md at 803 words exceeds 400-word threshold (improved from 982w last audit). memory/2026-03-18.md at 749 words also exceeds threshold — this is a high-activity day log that will age out. All other files under threshold. AGENTS.md Swarm Canvas and Context Guard sections remain candidates for on-demand reads.
3. Bite-Sizer non-compliance — 8 workflow files with >3 inline steps and no step directory: - `commands/workflows/BAR.md` — 6 steps inline, no step dir. Split into steps. - `commands/workflows/BOOK.md` — 26 steps inline, no step dir. Highest priority: this is a large workflow. - `commands/workflows/BRE.md` — 5 steps inline, no step dir. - `commands/workflows/FIX.md` — 6 steps inline, no step dir. - `commands/workflows/OPINV.md` — 12 steps inline, no step dir. - `commands/workflows/RELAB.md` — 9 steps inline, no step dir. - `commands/workflows/REVIEW.md` — 7 steps inline, no step dir. - `commands/hellbot/HELL.md` — 6 steps inline, no step dir.
4. FER monitor plist files remain on disk. `~/Library/LaunchAgents/clawstin.fer-monitor.plist` and `lifeboat-system/launch-agents/clawstin.fer-monitor.plist` still exist. However, the LaunchAgent is no longer loaded in launchd — partial resolution since last audit. File cleanup still pending. 11th consecutive audit (plist on disk), resolved (launchd unloaded).

Carried Over


1. Gmail OAuth expired (both accounts) — CRITICAL. adalsey 9th consecutive, krspamgang 2nd. Ghost action required: Google Cloud console → Production publishing status, then re-auth both accounts on Mac Mini. 2. FER plist files on disk — 11th consecutive (but LaunchAgent now unloaded from launchd — partial fix). Only file deletion remains.

Resolved Since Last Audit


- polymarket-resolve delivery error — fixed. Channel set to `"signal"`, last run OK with delivery successful. ✓ - clawstin.fer-monitor LaunchAgent loaded — now unloaded from launchd. Plist file still on disk (tracked above). ✓ - com.clawstin.balance-notify exit 1 — LaunchAgent no longer loaded. ✓ - clawstin.papertrader exit 127 — LaunchAgent no longer loaded. ✓ - Smoke test balance-anchor false positive — smoke test now reports PASS ($99.12, 6.0h ago). ✓

Past-Due Schedule Entries


None. Pre-audit reports 0 past-due entries.

Fired One-Shot Reminders


None flagged by pre_audit.

Step Completion Checklist

Step 1 -- Pre-Audit Data: completed (13 checks; 0 errors, 2 warnings: LaunchAgents 2 flagged gmail triage exit 1, log errors 14 gmail entries) Step 1.5 -- Smoke Tests: completed (8 pass, 2 warn, 2 fail: gmail-adalsey + gmail-krspamgang tokens expired; triage recency stale for both) Step 2 -- Last Report Review: completed (5 carried-over from last audit; 5 resolved, 2 persisting) Step 3 -- Daily Integration: completed (2026-03-19 + 2026-03-18 logs reviewed; all referenced script paths verified: proof_gate.py ✓, renderer_v4.py ✓, pipeline.py ✓, braintrainer-prompt.txt ✓, hue.py ✓) Step 4 -- Git Diff + Downstream: completed (17 commits reviewed; major: ReLab v4 renderer, proof gate, braintrainer cron, HORD/HRE/HMOD bite-sizer rebuild; no stale references found in configs for changed paths) Step 5 -- File Health Review: completed (MEMORY.md 117w healthy; context load 2,280w over 1,500 threshold; AGENTS.md 803w over 400 threshold; SCHEDULE.md 0 past-due; injected files consistent — no contradictions found) Step 6 -- Cron + Automation: completed (47 total jobs, 36 enabled, 11 disabled; all models appropriate per exclusion rules; Braintrainer cron (b1489930) is new — first fire pending; bed-wake-light one-shot scheduled 2026-03-19 10:00 UTC) Step 7 -- Script Validation: completed (send-todo.sh ✓, triage-proton.py ✓, triage.py ✓ exists but OAuth expired, triage-krspamgang.py ✓ exists but OAuth expired, watchdog/ ✓ 6 files present, consecutive-failures.txt exists) Step 8 -- Cross-File Consistency: completed (FER plist → deleted script file still on disk; 8 workflow files lacking bite-sizer step dirs; no other contradictions between files)

CAPABILITY QUEUE

PAPER TRADING

Model Portfolio Value P/L Cash Holdings
MACD+RSI $972.22 $-27.78 (-2.8%) $374.72 MSTR 1.1148sh @$134.55, QQQ 0.2491sh @$610.64, CRM 0.7494sh @$196.89, GOOGL 0.4798sh @$308.14
Momentum EMA $1000.01 +$0.01 (+0.0%) $850.00 NVDA 0.8109sh @$184.99
Rocket Rider $1159.43 +$159.43 (+15.9%) $1159.43 Cash only
News Sentiment $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sector Surfer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Earnings Stalker $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Fear Eater $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Unusual Volume $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Gap Trader $995.33 $-4.67 (-0.5%) $696.35 ADBE 0.6013sh @$249.44, MSTR 1.0594sh @$140.63
Consolidation Bomber $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Trump Whisperer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Capitol Copycat $1007.43 +$7.43 (+0.7%) $807.43 VST 0.6314sh @$158.38, TEM 1.9790sh @$50.53
Dual Momentum $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Squeeze Breakout N/A N/A N/A —
52wk High N/A N/A N/A —
Donchian Turtle $994.89 $-5.11 (-0.5%) $845.65 MSTR 1.0510sh @$141.99
Williams %R $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
KAMA Adaptive $981.70 $-18.30 (-1.8%) $382.88 MSTR 1.0796sh @$138.94, GOOGL 0.4886sh @$307.35, NVDA 0.8130sh @$184.99, CRM 0.7530sh @$196.89
Triple MA $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Insider Buyer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Index Rider $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
FDA Catalyst $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sprint Rider $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Trend Reversion $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sector Rotator $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Volume Breakout $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Dual Timeframe $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only

AGENT TRADER

Portfolio: $990.16 ($-9.84 / -1.0%)  |  Cash: $750.16  |  Trades: 3 (W:0 L:1 WR:0%)

Thesis (2026-03-18): [risk-off / ] Broad indices selling off uniformly (~-0.6-0.7%) while select momentum names show relative strength pre-market, suggesting rotation into idiosyncratic stories rather than broad risk-on; look to buy strength in isolated leaders but size conservatively against the risk-off tape.

Candidates: AMD (4⭐), MSTR (3⭐), TSLA (4⭐), NFLX (3⭐)

SymbolPositionStopRationale
GOOGL0.77sh @ $310.92Stop $304.70Mega-cap strength, relative strength among tech, AI narrativ

POLYMARKET

Portfolio: $1000.00 (+$0.00 / +0.0%)  |  Bankroll: $512.01  |  Open: 9 positions  |  Resolved: 9 (W:0 L:0)  |  Realized P&L: +$0.00
MarketSideEntryBetEnds
Will Trump visit China by April 30?YES0.460$66.672026-04-30
Weed rescheduled by March 31?YES0.014$66.672026-03-31
Weed rescheduled by June 30?YES0.170$66.662026-03-31
MegaETH market cap (FDV) >$6B one day after launch?YES0.017$53.332026-06-30
Netanyahu out by March 31?YES0.028$53.332026-12-31
Netanyahu out by June 30?YES0.145$53.332026-12-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by March 31?YES0.030$42.672026-03-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by April 30?YES0.160$42.672026-03-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by June 30?YES0.380$42.662026-03-31

SECURITY AUDIT

Security Guard Report - 2026-03-19

Patrol time: 03:30 AM (America/New_York) Agent: Security Guard (Claude) AutoAudit verified: Yes (2026-03-19) Previous report: 2026-03-18

Executive Summary


Overall threat level: MEDIUM-HIGH (escalated from MEDIUM on 2026-03-18)
Escalation driven by two new findings: (1) three orphaned, undocumented http.server processes bound to 0.0.0.0 on ports 8767-8769 with unknown serving directories, and (2) the Cloudflare tunnel routes api.clawstin.org to a Flask API on port 8765 bound to 0.0.0.0 with write endpoints including voice command injection, email mark-as-read, and swarm state modification.
Signal alert required: NO (no finding reaches 9-10)
Changes since last patrol (2026-03-18): - NEW: SG-2026-03-19-001: Three orphaned http.server processes on ports 8767-8769 - NEW: SG-2026-03-19-002: Vitals API bound to 0.0.0.0 with write endpoints - RESOLVED: SG-2026-03-18-004 partially (Security Guard completed this run after 8 consecutive timeouts) - PERSISTS: World-readable files, FER plist on disk, lifeboat creds (accepted), no git remote
This patrol: 8 findings. 0 at severity 9-10, 1 at severity 7, 1 at severity 6, 6 at severity 2-3.

Detailed Findings


SG-2026-03-19-001: Three Orphaned http.server Processes (NEW)

Severity: 7 (MEDIUM) Category: Network Exposure / Process Anomaly
Evidence: ``` PID 72559 (PPID=1, started 10:45 AM): python3 -m http.server 8767 PID 72689 (PPID=1, started 10:48 AM): python3 -m http.server 8768 PID 76633 (PPID=1, started 1:55 PM): python3 -m http.server 8769 ``` Commands run: `ps aux | grep "http.server"`, `ps -p <PID> -o pid,ppid,command`
Key facts: - All three orphaned (PPID=1) — original parent process terminated - No `--directory` flag — serves CWD at spawn time (unknown) - Default binding: 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces including Tailscale 100.112.26.36) - Not in `launchctl list` (not managed by any LaunchAgent) - Not documented in 2026-03-18.md or 2026-03-19.md session logs - Not in Cloudflare tunnel ingress rules - Process priority: niced (SN state)
Impact: Unknown directory contents exposed on all network interfaces. Reachable from any Tailscale peer. If CWD was workspace root or home directory, sensitive files (GUARDRAILS.md, AGENTS.md, memory files, lifeboat-system/) could be browsable.
Rubric rationale: Rating 7 per "Services listening on localhost that could potentially bind to external interfaces" — these are already bound to 0.0.0.0. Not rated 8+ because: (a) not routed through Cloudflare tunnel (no internet exposure), (b) behind NAT (LAN only + Tailscale), (c) LuLu firewall may block inbound. However, Tailscale provides direct IP bypass of NAT.
Action required: 1. Identify serving directory: `lsof -p 72559 | grep cwd` (repeat for 72689, 76633) 2. Kill: `kill 72559 72689 76633` 3. Investigate origin: search recent session transcripts for `http.server` usage

SG-2026-03-19-002: Vitals API Bound to 0.0.0.0 with Write Endpoints (NEW)

Severity: 6 (LOW-MEDIUM) Category: Network Exposure / API Security
Evidence: File: `/Users/aicomputer/clawstin-app/server/api.py` Last line: `app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8765, debug=False)` LaunchAgent: `clawstin.vitals-api` (PID 781, running since boot) Cloudflare tunnel: `api.clawstin.org -> http://localhost:8765`
Commands run: `cat /Users/aicomputer/clawstin-app/server/api.py`, `grep -n "route" api.py`, `grep -n "require_auth" api.py`, `tail -20 api.py`
Auth: Bearer token loaded from encrypted Den (`clawstin_api_key`). 14 of 15 endpoints require auth. Unauthenticated endpoint: `/health` (status check only)
Write endpoints (all require auth): - `POST /todo/done` — marks TODO items complete - `POST /voice` — accepts audio upload, transcribes via Whisper, routes to OpenClaw - `POST /api/swarm/update` — modifies swarm canvas state - `POST /emails/<id>/read` — marks Gmail/Proton emails as read
Impact: API accessible from internet (api.clawstin.org) and directly from LAN/Tailscale. Auth protects all write endpoints but the 0.0.0.0 binding is unnecessarily broad — Cloudflare tunnel connects via localhost. The `/voice` endpoint is highest risk: audio -> transcription -> OpenClaw command execution, though OpenClaw guardrails provide defense-in-depth.
Rubric rationale: Rating 6 per "Developer tools left running" — auth is present but binding is overly permissive. Not rated 7+ because auth on all sensitive endpoints, key stored encrypted, and OpenClaw guardrails on /voice path.
Action: Change `host="0.0.0.0"` to `host="127.0.0.1"` in api.py line ~last.

SG-2026-03-19-003: World-Readable Files in Workspace (PERSISTS — 4th consecutive)

Severity: 3 (LOW) Category: File Permissions
Evidence: Command: `find /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/workspace/memory -maxdepth 1 -type f -name "*.md" -perm -004` Result: 7 files at 644 (email-rules-update, TIMER-FIX-SUMMARY, where-we-left-off, doc-reference, subagent-scripts-build, tailscale-howto, autoaudit-test)
Command: `find /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/workspace -maxdepth 1 -type f -perm -004` Result: 20+ files including CREDENTIALS.md, README.md, LIFEBOAT.md etc.
CREDENTIALS.md checked: `grep "password" CREDENTIALS.md` shows only Den references like `[in Den: key_name]`. No actual credential values.
All sensitive files (daily logs 600, session transcripts 600, Den 600, lifeboat 600) are properly restricted.
Impact: Low — no secrets in world-readable files. Single-user system.

SG-2026-03-19-004: Stale FER Monitor Plist on Disk (PERSISTS — 12th consecutive)

Severity: 2 (LOW) Category: Configuration Hygiene
Evidence: - File: `/Users/aicomputer/Library/LaunchAgents/clawstin.fer-monitor.plist` (created 2026-02-26, 644 perms) - Also in: `lifeboat-system/launch-agents/clawstin.fer-monitor.plist` - `launchctl list | grep fer-monitor` returns empty — NOT loaded - Command: `stat /Users/aicomputer/Library/LaunchAgents/clawstin.fer-monitor.plist`
Impact: None. Inactive file. Cleanup housekeeping only.

SG-2026-03-19-005: Lifeboat Plaintext Credentials (ACCEPTED — SG-2026-03-18-001)

Severity: 3 (downgraded per accepted risk)
Verification this patrol: - All lifeboat files 600: `find /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/workspace/lifeboat-system -type f -not -perm 600` returns empty - All dirs 700: `ls -la lifeboat-system/` confirms drwx------ on all subdirs - `.gitignore` excludes `lifeboat-system/` - Files updated 2026-03-19 02:00 (nightly backup) - Contains: API keys (ElevenLabs, OpenRouter), OAuth tokens (3 Gmail, 2 Drive), Cloudflare tunnel secret, Fernet key, Signal identity
No re-escalation. Ghost accepted 2026-03-18.

SG-2026-03-19-006: Chrome Remote Desktop (ACCEPTED — SG-2026-03-09-005)

Severity: 3 (downgraded per accepted risk)
Verification: PID 812 running (`ps aux | grep remoting_me2me`). SSH auth socket at `/tmp/chromoting.aicomputer.ssh_auth_sock` NOT found — `ls -la` returns "No such file or directory".
No re-escalation.

SG-2026-03-19-007: Signal-CLI on Localhost:8080 No Auth (ACCEPTED — SG-2026-03-15-004)

Severity: 3 (downgraded per accepted risk)
Verification: PID 69422 running signal-cli daemon on `127.0.0.1:8080` (`ps aux | grep signal`). Binding confirmed localhost-only from command-line args: `--http 127.0.0.1:8080`.
No re-escalation.

SG-2026-03-19-008: No Git Remote (PERSISTS — informational)

Severity: 2 (LOW) Category: Disaster Recovery
Evidence: `git` command blocked by sandbox. Prior patrols confirmed no remote. Lifeboat nightly backup via rclone provides file-level recovery.

Threat Landscape (External Intelligence)


External URL checks unavailable (sandbox network restrictions).
| Source | Status | Last Checked | |--------|--------|-------------| | NVD (NIST) | Not checked | Sandbox blocked | | Node.js Security | Not checked | Sandbox blocked | | macOS Security | Not checked | Sandbox blocked | | OpenClaw Advisories | Accepted risk | 2026-03-18 | | Signal-CLI Issues | Not checked | Sandbox blocked |

Stack Versions

- OpenSSL: 3.6.1 (2026-01-27) — current - Node.js: v25.6.1 — current - signal-cli: 0.13.24 — current - Python: 3.9 (system) — outdated but functional - npm audit: Cannot run (no package-lock.json) - pip outdated: 19 packages including anthropic (0.84.0 -> 0.86.0), openai-whisper (20240930 -> 20250625). No known urgent CVEs.

System Health (Non-Security)


- LuLu firewall: Running (PID 796 + system extension PID 334). 53+ process rules. - Gmail triage: Both accounts failing (exit 1) — expired OAuth tokens. Operational issue tracked by AutoAudit. - Tailscaled: Running (root, PID 269). Direct IP: 100.112.26.36. - Cloudflared: Running (PID 791). 4 ingress: clawstin.org(8877), voice.clawstin.org(3334), webhook.clawstin.org(18789), api.clawstin.org(8765). - OpenClaw Gateway: Running (PID 69362, 11.8% mem ~2GB). - Docker: Running (PID 28866). - Ollama: Running (PID 817). - Proton Mail Bridge: Running (PID 813). - Security Guard timeout streak: 8 consecutive prior runs at 2-min kill. This run succeeded.

Risk Acceptance Cross-Reference


| Finding | Accepted Risk Match | Status | |---------|-------------------|--------| | SG-2026-03-19-001 | None | NEW — Ghost review needed | | SG-2026-03-19-002 | None | NEW — Ghost review needed | | SG-2026-03-19-003 | None | Low, not yet accepted | | SG-2026-03-19-004 | None | Housekeeping | | SG-2026-03-19-005 | SG-2026-03-18-001 | Accepted | | SG-2026-03-19-006 | SG-2026-03-09-005 | Accepted | | SG-2026-03-19-007 | SG-2026-03-15-004 | Accepted | | SG-2026-03-19-008 | None | Informational |

Methodology


Sandbox limitations: lsof, netstat, fdesetup, pgrep, docker, git, find -exec, grep with alternation all blocked. No stderr redirects. Workarounds: ps aux, ps -p, individual grep, plutil -p, launchctl list, stat, find with -perm. Coverage gaps: FileVault status, open connections, Docker state, git remotes, external threat intel.