Researcher Report β 2026-03-22
Run time: 2026-03-22 01:05 ET
Phase 1: Tech Research
Sources scanned: 100 items across HN + RSS feeds
Candidates after scoring: 15
CBL evaluated: 15
EAT (queued to fridge)
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[EAT] Show HN: Atomic β Self-hosted, semantically-connected personal knowledge base β _β
queued_
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[EAT] OpenCode β Open source AI coding agent β _β
queued_
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[EAT] Why Security Validation Is Becoming Agentic β _β
queued_
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[EAT] Trivy Security Scanner GitHub Actions Breached, 75 Tags Hijacked to Steal CI/CD Secrets β _β
queued_
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[EAT] Apple Fixes WebKit Vulnerability Enabling Same-Origin Policy Bypass on iOS and macOS β _β
queued_
HOLD (notable but not fridged)
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[HOLD] How Ceros Gives Security Teams Visibility and Control in Claude Code β
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[HOLD] Show HN: Termcraft β terminal-first 2D sandbox survival in Rust β
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[HOLD] Hide macOS Tahoe's Menu Icons β
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[HOLD] Thinking Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI Is Reshaping Human Reasoning β
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[HOLD] An Atlas of DRAGNs β
- _(and 1 more HOLD items)_
Phase 2: PaperTrader Experiments
_No snapshot data available for today._
Phase 2 Errors
- β οΈ No snapshot for today β cannot analyze performance
Phase 3: Optimization Analysis
> _Stale files and cron health are auditor territory (autoaudit). This phase covers cost and model routing only._
Cost Optimization Suggestions
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bizbot (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task β ~10-50x cost reduction per run
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agent-trader-premarket (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task β ~10-50x cost reduction per run
Cost Optimization Opportunities
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Opus referenced in 31 mentions across 28 sessions (40% of model refs)
β Review Opus-heavy sessions β most tasks could run on Sonnet at ~10x lower cost _Up to ~10x on affected calls_
Phase 4: ClawHub Skill Scan
35 suspicious skill(s):
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-skill β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-01-26), no visible source code verification, vague description lacking specifics about which MCP tools/endpoints are accessed, requests broad network access (web search, crawling, LinkedIn), and the generic author name "simlocker" with no verifiable history.
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-hass β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-10), no visible source code accessible for review, requests network access to Home Assistant devices, and vague implementation details make it impossible to audit potential security risks or code injection vectors.
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[SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-plugin β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from new account (2026-02-02 publish date), no visible source code, requests network access + process spawning capabilities (MCP server execution), vague description lacking implementation details, and the description reads as agent-directed instructions ("Enable AI agents to discover and execute tools") rather than user-focused documentation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] atlassian-mcp β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: (1) Zero downloads with very recent publication date, (2) Requests Docker execution + filesystem access + network access to external Atlassian services, (3) Requires storing/handling API credentials, (4) No visible source code repository linked, and (5) New author account with single skill.
If reconsidered: Would require verification of author identity, source code audit, and credential handling security review before use in any environment.
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[SUSPICIOUS] clickup-mcp β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads from new account (published 2026-01-06), no visible source code repository linked, requests OAuth authentication without transparent permission scoping, and the description lacks implementation details about how MCP integration works or what security boundaries are enforced.
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[SUSPICIOUS] glin-profanity-mcp β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-01), no visible source code repository linked, vague author profile ("thegdsks"), and the description is suspiciously tailored to prompt an AI to use it ("Use when reviewing batches," "when AI needs") rather than explaining what developers would do with it.
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[SUSPICIOUS] xiaohongshu-mcp-skill β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-28), no visible source code repository linked, vague description with truncation ("like/comment/fa..."), requests network access to external service (Xiaohongshu), and the skill operates on social media platforms which creates potential for credential theft or unauthorized posting.
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-client β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads combined with very recent publication date (2026-02-22), vague description lacking technical specifics about implementation or security model, requests network access and likely process spawning (inherent to MCP client functionality), and no visible source code repository linked.
If proceeding: Requires code audit of the MCP client implementation, verification of author identity/reputation, and explicit security review of network access patterns before any integration with agent systems.
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[SUSPICIOUS] wordpress-mcp β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-10), no visible source code repository linked, vague permission model for "any WordPress admin task", and requires external plugin dependency (AI Engine) with unclear security controls for MCP Server access to WordPress installations.
Not relevant to active projects (mcp listed as keyword but this is WordPress-specific, not general MCP infrastructure).
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[SUSPICIOUS] arc-security-mcp β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-17) by unfamiliar author, (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Vague description making unsubstantiated claims ("743+ findings from 361+ skill audits") without verifiable metrics or documentation, (4) "AI-first security intelligence with LLM-powered intent analysis" suggests this skill may be designed to interact with or instruct AI systems rather than provide transparent security tooling.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-06, author JK-0001), no visible source code linked, vague description lacks implementation details, and the trigger keywords appear designed to activate broadly rather than describe actual skill functionality.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads from new account (published 2026-02-20), vague description lacking implementation details, requests broad capabilities (form filling, data scraping, process spawning, scheduled jobs) without specifying permission boundaries, no visible source code link provided, and the generic nature of "ai-web-automation" with undefined scope suggests potential for privilege escalation or supply chain attack.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows-0-1-0 β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-07) + vague description lacking technical implementation details + no visible source code + author "lucasayala" with no verifiable track record on ClawHub.
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[SUSPICIOUS] agentic-workflow-automation β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-26), vague/truncated description that doesn't specify actual capabilities or permissions, author handle "0x-Professor" suggests potential obfuscation, and the description phrase "Use for trigger/action orchestration...automation handoff arti..." appears incomplete/cut off which could indicate hidden content or intentionally vague documentation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-business-automation β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description is directed at an AI agent ("Turn your AI agent into...") rather than describing what the skill does, (4) Vague implementation claims ("no n8n or Zapier required") without technical details on how workflows are actually designed/deployed, (5) Overly broad scope (5 business domains) suggests either vapor-ware or a wrapper around undisclosed external services.
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[SUSPICIOUS] data-automation-service β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-19), new/unverified author "Katrina-jpg", vague description in Chinese that doesn't specify actual implementation details or permissions, no visible source code repository linked, and the broad scope (data cleaning, automation, multi-API integration) combined with zero track record makes verification impossible.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-workflow β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-03-06), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description contains directives seemingly aimed at AI systems ("εΉ«δΈε°δΌζ₯θ¨θ¨" / "help SMEs design"), (4) Vague implementation details β claims to help build n8n/Zapier workflows but provides no actual skill code or methodology, (5) Author account "isaacloi1995-dot" appears to be a throwaway naming pattern.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-consulting β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new/suspicious account (yang1002378395-cmyk), (2) No visible source code reference, (3) Future publish date (2026-03-14) is anomalous, (4) Vague description with no technical specifics about what the skill actually does or what permissions it requires, (5) Description reads like marketing copy rather than technical documentation, making it impossible to assess actual functionality or safety.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-tool β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-03-08), vague description in Chinese offering "batch generation" without transparent source code visibility, and the generic nature combined with new author profile matches common patterns for low-effort or potentially malicious skill distribution.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-ceo-automation β [SUSPICIOUS]
Zero downloads + brand new account (2026-02-28) + vague description ("fully automated company operations") with no visible source code + matches "automation" and "agent" keywords creates moderate risk profile warranting deeper inspection before use.
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[SUSPICIOUS] homelab-cluster β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + brand new account (published 2026-02-12), no visible source code mentioned, vague description lacking technical specifics about what "expert MoE routing" entails, and the skill requests management of inference clusters which implies significant system-level access permissions that should be explicitly documented.
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[SUSPICIOUS] homeserver β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-23), no visible source code repository linked, vague truncated description suggesting hidden functionality, requests potentially dangerous permissions (port scanning, Wake-on-LAN, process spawning via homebutler CLI), and new author account with single skill.
This skill does not warrant Ghost review given the combination of anonymity, capability scope, and fresh account indicators.
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[SUSPICIOUS] pi-admin β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-01-14), no visible source code mentioned, requests filesystem and process spawning permissions (system administration implies broad OS access), and the description lacks technical specifics about implementation or safety boundaries.
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[SUSPICIOUS] pi-health β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-09), no visible source code repository linked, requests filesystem access and process spawning capabilities (CPU temp, throttling, voltage monitoring require privileged system access), and the skill description is written as direct instructions to an AI agent ("Use when monitoring Pi health, diagnosing...").
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[SUSPICIOUS] 0x0-messenger β [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-23), new/unverified author, no visible source code, vague technical implementation details, and the description is framed as direct instructions to an AI agent ("For agent-to-agent messaging, approval flows") rather than user-centric documentation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-12, 0 downloads), no visible source code repository linked, vague technical description without implementation details or safety disclaimers for financial advice, and the skill name/description match an active project keyword ("trading") which could indicate opportunistic targeting.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-devbox β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) Description is directed at an AI agent ("User describes trading intent in natural language, agent writes..."), (3) No visible source code repository linked, (4) Executes arbitrary Python code based on user input (backtest strategy generation) which poses code injection and sandbox escape risks.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-brain β [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple red flags: zero downloads with a very recent publish date (2026-02-27), vague description lacking technical implementation details, the description is phrased as instructions to an AI agent ("Load Travis's personal trading strategy...to guide aggressive trades"), no visible source code repository link, and it requests access to undefined "personal" data and execution context that could enable financial manipulation or unauthorized trading.
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[SUSPICIOUS] openmm-grid-trading β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-25) + no visible source code + vague description lacking implementation details + "grid trading strategies" requests network access to financial systems + author account "adacapo21" with no verifiable history.
If reconsidered: Relevant to automation keyword, but insufficient trust data to proceed without source code review and author verification.
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[SUSPICIOUS] auto-trading-strategy β [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill has multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a new account (2026-03-13), vague description offering "professional trading strategy guides" without specifying actual functionality or implementation details, no visible source code repository linked, and the generic nature suggests it may request network/financial data accessβtypical of malicious financial manipulation tools.
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[SUSPICIOUS] kalshi-cli-trading β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-03-04), no visible source code, requests network access to external trading platform (Kalshi), spawns CLI processes, and vague description truncated mid-sentence without implementation details.
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[SUSPICIOUS] futu-trading-bot β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new/untrusted account (author: jeffersonling1217-png), future publication date (2026-03-08), no visible source code repository linked, requests real financial market access and trading execution capabilities, and vague description lacking technical implementation details or security documentation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-software-efficiency β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-03-16), vague description lacking technical specifics, no visible source code repository linked, and the skill requests unspecified "custom functionality" without detailing what permissions or system access it requiresβtypical markers of unvetted external content that could pose security risks.
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[SUSPICIOUS] finance-trading β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-03-17, author "Brioche-bit" with no history), (2) No visible source code provided in metadata, (3) Requests network access (BTC/USDT trading requires live market data/API calls), (4) Financial trading skill with real monetary implications requires exceptional vetting scrutiny.
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[SUSPICIOUS] skill-trading-journal β [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-03-17), vague truncated description (incomplete with "..."), no visible source code repository linked, and requests for filesystem access to log trades + generate reports which could involve unauthorized data persistence or process spawning.
Not recommended for installation without source code review and author verification from Zero2Ai-hub.
Budget Summary
Total spent: $0.0282 / $5.00 cap
API calls: 50
Tokens: 18876 input + 3270 output
| Model | Input | Output | Cost | Note |
|-------|-------|--------|------|------|
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 23 | $0.000290 | CBL:How Ceros Gives Security Teams Visib |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 269 | 20 | $0.000295 | CBL:ThreatsDay Bulletin: FortiGate RaaS, |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 258 | 22 | $0.000294 | CBL:Meta to Shut Down Instagram End-to-E |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 236 | 23 | $0.000281 | CBL:Show HN: Atomic β Self-hosted, seman |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 221 | 21 | $0.000261 | CBL:OpenCode β Open source AI coding age |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 264 | 26 | $0.000315 | CBL:Magento PolyShell Flaw Enables Unaut |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 243 | 21 | $0.000278 | CBL:Why Security Validation Is Becoming |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 238 | 27 | $0.000298 | CBL:Show HN: Termcraft β terminal-first |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 249 | 26 | $0.000303 | CBL:Hide macOS Tahoe's Menu Icons |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 251 | 25 | $0.000301 | CBL:Thinking Fast, Slow, and Artificial: |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 232 | 24 | $0.000282 | CBL:An Atlas of DRAGNs |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 240 | 24 | $0.000288 | CBL:Linux Applications Programming by Ex |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 259 | 29 | $0.000323 | CBL:Trivy Security Scanner GitHub Action |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 271 | 24 | $0.000313 | CBL:54 EDR Killers Use BYOVD to Exploit |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 250 | 26 | $0.000304 | CBL:Apple Fixes WebKit Vulnerability Ena |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 418 | 78 | $0.000646 | ClawHub:mcp-skill |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 407 | 58 | $0.000558 | ClawHub:mcp-hass |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 81 | $0.000673 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-plugin |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 468 | 105 | $0.000794 | ClawHub:atlassian-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 63 | $0.000585 | ClawHub:clickup-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 450 | 82 | $0.000688 | ClawHub:glin-profanity-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 449 | 81 | $0.000683 | ClawHub:xiaohongshu-mcp-skill |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 404 | 104 | $0.000739 | ClawHub:mcp-client |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 476 | 89 | $0.000737 | ClawHub:wordpress-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 432 | 118 | $0.000818 | ClawHub:arc-security-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 495 | 62 | $0.000644 | ClawHub:automation-workflows |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 92 | $0.000704 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 506 | 56 | $0.000629 | ClawHub:automation-workflows-0-1-0 |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 94 | $0.000719 | ClawHub:agentic-workflow-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 439 | 118 | $0.000823 | ClawHub:afrexai-business-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 431 | 86 | $0.000689 | ClawHub:data-automation-service |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 492 | 120 | $0.000874 | ClawHub:ai-automation-workflow |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 441 | 107 | $0.000781 | ClawHub:ai-automation-consulting |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 64 | $0.000587 | ClawHub:automation-tool |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 401 | 58 | $0.000553 | ClawHub:ai-ceo-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 74 | $0.000624 | ClawHub:homelab-cluster |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 425 | 99 | $0.000736 | ClawHub:homeserver |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 405 | 60 | $0.000564 | ClawHub:pi-admin |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 466 | 79 | $0.000689 | ClawHub:pi-health |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 428 | 78 | $0.000654 | ClawHub:0x0-messenger |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 409 | 76 | $0.000631 | ClawHub:trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 413 | 82 | $0.000658 | ClawHub:trading-devbox |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 93 | $0.000703 | ClawHub:trading-brain |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 90 | $0.000693 | ClawHub:openmm-grid-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 78 | $0.000640 | ClawHub:auto-trading-strategy |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 59 | $0.000577 | ClawHub:kalshi-cli-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 419 | 71 | $0.000619 | ClawHub:futu-trading-bot |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 76 | $0.000645 | ClawHub:trading-software-efficiency |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 93 | $0.000714 | ClawHub:finance-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 85 | $0.000683 | ClawHub:skill-trading-journal |