Researcher Report — 2026-03-23
Run time: 2026-03-23 01:04 ET
Phase 1: Tech Research
Sources scanned: 578 items across HN + RSS feeds
Candidates after scoring: 15
CBL evaluated: 15
EAT (queued to fridge)
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[EAT] Teaching Claude to QA a mobile app — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] Autonoma: A Hierarchical Multi-Agent Framework for End-to-End Workflow Automation — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] Claude Code Security and Magecart: Getting the Threat Model Right — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] ⚡ Weekly Recap: Chrome 0-Days, Router Botnets, AWS Breach, Rogue AI Agents & More — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] OpenClaw AI Agent Flaws Could Enable Prompt Injection and Data Exfiltration — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] A Subgoal-driven Framework for Improving Long-Horizon LLM Agents — _✅ queued_
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[EAT] Utility-Guided Agent Orchestration for Efficient LLM Tool Use — _✅ queued_
HOLD (notable but not fridged)
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[HOLD] TTQ: Activation-Aware Test-Time Quantization to Accelerate LLM Inference On The Fly —
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[HOLD] PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Planning Abstractions for Cloud-Assisted LLM Agents —
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[HOLD] Automated Membership Inference Attacks: Discovering MIA Signal Computations using LLM Agents —
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[HOLD] A comprehensive study of LLM-based argument classification: from Llama through DeepSeek to GPT-5.2 —
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[HOLD] CLaRE-ty Amid Chaos: Quantifying Representational Entanglement to Predict Ripple Effects in LLM Editing —
- _(and 2 more HOLD items)_
Phase 2: PaperTrader Experiments
_No snapshot data available for today._
Phase 2 Errors
- ⚠️ No snapshot for today — cannot analyze performance
Phase 3: Optimization Analysis
> _Stale files and cron health are auditor territory (autoaudit). This phase covers cost and model routing only._
Cost Optimization Suggestions
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bizbot (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run
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agent-trader-premarket (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run
Cost Optimization Opportunities
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Opus referenced in 31 mentions across 29 sessions (39% of model refs)
→ Review Opus-heavy sessions — most tasks could run on Sonnet at ~10x lower cost _Up to ~10x on affected calls_
Phase 4: ClawHub Skill Scan
35 suspicious skill(s):
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with new publication date (2026-01-26), vague description lacking implementation details, requests broad network access (web search, crawling, LinkedIn) and filesystem permissions typical of MCP server tools, no visible source code repository linked, and the skill name "mcp-skill" is generic without specificity about which MCP server or tools are actually provided.
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-hass — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-10, 0 downloads), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access to Home Assistant instances (potential attack surface for credential exfiltration or lateral movement into smart home infrastructure).
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[SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-plugin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-02), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests broad network access and process spawning capabilities ("execute tools from configured MCP servers"), (4) Description is agent-directed ("Enable AI agents to discover and execute"), (5) Vague implementation details about what "configured MCP servers" means and how they're validated.
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[SUSPICIOUS] atlassian-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + new author + requires Docker process spawning + requests external network access (Jira API credentials) + vague implementation details with no visible source code repository linked.
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[SUSPICIOUS] clickup-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-01-06), no visible source code repository link, requests OAuth authentication to external service (ClickUp), and the vague description lacks implementation details or security documentation typical of legitimate MCP skills.
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[SUSPICIOUS] glin-profanity-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-01, author "thegdsks" appears to be first submission), no visible source code repository link provided, and the description is directed at AI agent use cases ("when AI needs content moderation capabilities") rather than describing the tool itself objectively.
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[SUSPICIOUS] xiaohongshu-mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-28), no visible source code repository linked, vague truncated description suggesting network/process access ("Operate Xiaohongshu via local MCP service"), and the skill requests interaction with an external social media platform which implies filesystem/network permissions outside a controlled workspace.
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[SUSPICIOUS] mcp-client —
[SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-22, author "nantes" with no history), no visible source code, vague description that doesn't specify what MCP endpoints/services it connects to, and the generic "connect to tools, data sources and services" phrasing lacks concrete implementation details needed for security assessment.
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[SUSPICIOUS] wordpress-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-10), no visible source code repository linked, vague permission model for "any WordPress admin task", and requests network access to WordPress sites plus filesystem operations (media management, post creation) without transparent scope documentation.
Not relevant to active projects (mcp/automation contexts would need verified implementation details).
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[SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-debugger — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-03-04), (2) No visible source code referenced, (3) Vague description cut off mid-sentence ("providing deep-..."), (4) Author handle "tmstudio667-commits" suggests automated/generic account creation, (5) Requests deep system diagnostics which typically require elevated permissions and network access.
Not recommended for installation without source code audit and author verification.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-06), no visible source code repository linked, vague implementation details for a complex skill, and description reads as agent instructions rather than technical documentation ("Use when identifying...", "Trigger on...").
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with newly created account (2026-02-20), vague description lacking implementation details, requests broad permissions (multi-browser automation, filesystem access for form filling/scraping), and no visible source code available for inspection.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows-0-1-0 — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-07, author "lucasayala" with no visible reputation), no visible source code repository linked, and vague description that doesn't specify actual implementation details, permissions, or dependencies for the claimed automation tool integrations (Zapier, Make, n8n).
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[SUSPICIOUS] agentic-workflow-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-26), vague/truncated description that doesn't fully explain functionality, author handle "0x-Professor" suggests minimal reputation/verification, no visible source code mentioned, and the skill name + description pattern (agentic workflow automation) combined with zero adoption suggests this could be a test payload or low-trust contribution.
Not recommended for integration without source code audit and author verification from ClawHub maintainers.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-workflows — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-05), vague description lacking implementation details, no visible source code repository link, and the description reads as capability statements rather than concrete documentation—typical of untrusted external content that could mask permission overreach or malicious behavior.
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[SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-business-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-13), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description is directive language aimed at an AI agent ("Turn your AI agent into..." / "Design, document, implement...") rather than neutral documentation of what the skill does, (4) Vague implementation claims ("no n8n or Zapier required") without explaining the actual mechanism, (5) Author account "1kalin" with no verifiable history.
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[SUSPICIOUS] automation-tool — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a newly created account (2026-03-08), vague description in Chinese offering "batch generation" without specifying implementation details, no visible source code, and the generic nature suggests potential for misuse in automated content manipulation or spam generation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-automation-strategy — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + brand new account (published 2026-02-19), vague description with truncation ("across any..."), no visible source code referenced, and the generic nature makes it impossible to assess what permissions or network access it actually requires.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-ceo-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new account with future publish date (2026), (2) Vague description lacking technical specifics about what "fully automated company operations" means, (3) No visible source code link, (4) Description reads as a directive to an AI agent rather than technical documentation, (5) Requests for permissions/capabilities unclear but implied scope is dangerously broad.
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[SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation-1-0-0 — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) Requests network access and process spawning (Selenium/Puppeteer), (3) No visible source code repository linked, (4) Vague implementation details on retry/proxy handling, and (5) Description reads as a capability pitch rather than technical documentation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] homelab-cluster — [SUSPICIOUS]
Zero downloads, newly published (2026-02-12), vague description lacking technical specifics, no visible source code, and requests infrastructure-level access (cluster management, health monitoring) that requires careful permission verification before deployment.
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[SUSPICIOUS] truenas-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: No visible source code, zero downloads with newly published account (2026-02-09), requests network access to external TrueNAS API, and vague implementation details without transparency on authentication/permission handling.
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[SUSPICIOUS] homeserver — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads with a very recent publish date (2026-02-23), no visible source code repository, vague truncated description ending in "ba..." suggesting incomplete information, requests for sensitive permissions (filesystem access, process spawning, network operations including port scanning), and the author account "Higangssh" appears to have minimal reputation history.
Project relevance: Matches "homelab" and "monitoring" keywords, but trustworthiness concerns override relevance.
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[SUSPICIOUS] pi-admin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new/recent publication date, (2) No visible source code accessible for review, (3) Requests system-level access (resource monitoring, service management, updates) which requires elevated permissions and filesystem access outside typical workspace boundaries, (4) Author account "TheSethRose" appears to be a new publisher with no verifiable history.
This skill requests dangerous permissions (process spawning, system service control, package updates) that warrant manual code review before any consideration.
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[SUSPICIOUS] pi-health — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-09, 0 downloads), no visible source code repository linked, and the skill requires spawning processes to read system files (`/sys/class/thermal`, `/proc/cpuinfo`, etc.) which poses execution risk without transparent code review.
If proceeding: Relevant to homelab/Raspberry Pi monitoring projects, but source code audit required before installation.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-12), no visible source code indicated, vague description lacking implementation details, and "trading" matches a keyword but the skill's actual utility and safety profile cannot be verified without source code inspection.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-devbox — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-25), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description implies agent will execute arbitrary Python code generation ("agent writes a Python backtest strategy"), which creates code injection risk if user input isn't sanitized, (4) Requests execution capabilities that could spawn processes/filesystem access outside controlled sandbox.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-brain — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-27), vague description offering to "load" undefined personal trading strategy without visible source code, requests to "guide aggressive trades" suggests execution of financial decisions, and description reads as directive to an AI agent ("Load...to guide...trades").
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[SUSPICIOUS] openmm-grid-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-25), no visible source code repository linked, vague technical description lacking implementation details, and "grid trading" strategies involve financial transactions requiring strict security validation that cannot be assured from metadata alone.
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[SUSPICIOUS] auto-trading-strategy — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple critical red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-03-13), new/unfamiliar author account (863king), vague description lacking technical implementation details, requests for sensitive capabilities (trading strategy execution, market prediction), and the skill offers financial/trading guidance which could facilitate harmful activities if compromised.
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[SUSPICIOUS] kalshi-cli-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + new account (published 2026-03-04), vague description ending mid-sentence ("place..."), no visible source code, and requests network access to external trading platform plus likely process spawning for CLI tool execution.
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[SUSPICIOUS] futu-trading-bot — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests real financial market access and trade execution capabilities with HK market data, (4) Vague implementation details for a high-risk financial application, (5) Author account appears to use auto-generated naming pattern typical of throwaway accounts.
This skill involves real trading operations on live markets, which requires exceptionally high trust and transparency — neither of which this submission demonstrates.
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[SUSPICIOUS] finance-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-03-17), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access (trading API calls) and likely filesystem access (trade logging), (4) Author "Brioche-bit" has no verifiable history, (5) Description lacks specifics on API integrations, data sources, or security model for handling credentials.
Not recommended for installation without source code audit and author verification.
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[SUSPICIOUS] trading-software-efficiency — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads, newly published account (2026 date anomaly), vague description without visible source code or implementation details, and the skill requests unspecified "custom functionality" which could involve filesystem or process access for trading software integration.
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[SUSPICIOUS] skill-trading-journal — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-03-17), (2) vague/truncated description that doesn't specify implementation details or permissions, (3) no visible source code repository linked, (4) trading journal skills typically require persistent filesystem access and network calls which should be explicitly declared but are not mentioned.
Not a clear fit for active projects listed (mcp, homelab, raspberry pi infrastructure focus), and the opaque nature of external financial tracking tools presents both security and functional reliability concerns without source code
Budget Summary
Total spent: $0.0280 / $5.00 cap
API calls: 50
Tokens: 18801 input + 3231 output
| Model | Input | Output | Cost | Note |
|-------|-------|--------|------|------|
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 247 | 26 | $0.000302 | CBL:TTQ: Activation-Aware Test-Time Quan |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 244 | 26 | $0.000299 | CBL:PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Plannin |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 243 | 21 | $0.000278 | CBL:Automated Membership Inference Attac |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 260 | 22 | $0.000296 | CBL:Teaching Claude to QA a mobile app |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 23 | $0.000290 | CBL:A comprehensive study of LLM-based a |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 254 | 24 | $0.000299 | CBL:CLaRE-ty Amid Chaos: Quantifying Rep |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 232 | 23 | $0.000278 | CBL:A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agen |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 242 | 25 | $0.000294 | CBL:Autonoma: A Hierarchical Multi-Agent |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 20 | $0.000278 | CBL:How Ceros Gives Security Teams Visib |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 249 | 21 | $0.000283 | CBL:Claude Code Security and Magecart: G |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 267 | 24 | $0.000310 | CBL:⚡ Weekly Recap: Chrome 0-Days, Route |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 257 | 23 | $0.000298 | CBL:OpenClaw AI Agent Flaws Could Enable |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 241 | 29 | $0.000309 | CBL:PowerLens: Taming LLM Agents for Saf |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 240 | 24 | $0.000288 | CBL:A Subgoal-driven Framework for Impro |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 237 | 22 | $0.000278 | CBL:Utility-Guided Agent Orchestration f |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 418 | 90 | $0.000694 | ClawHub:mcp-skill |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 407 | 74 | $0.000622 | ClawHub:mcp-hass |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 101 | $0.000753 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-plugin |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 468 | 48 | $0.000566 | ClawHub:atlassian-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 60 | $0.000573 | ClawHub:clickup-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 450 | 75 | $0.000660 | ClawHub:glin-profanity-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 449 | 79 | $0.000675 | ClawHub:xiaohongshu-mcp-skill |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 404 | 84 | $0.000659 | ClawHub:mcp-client |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 476 | 82 | $0.000709 | ClawHub:wordpress-mcp |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 106 | $0.000766 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-debugger |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 495 | 64 | $0.000652 | ClawHub:automation-workflows |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 61 | $0.000580 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 506 | 79 | $0.000721 | ClawHub:automation-workflows-0-1-0 |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 112 | $0.000791 | ClawHub:agentic-workflow-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 71 | $0.000620 | ClawHub:ai-automation-workflows |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 439 | 116 | $0.000815 | ClawHub:afrexai-business-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 69 | $0.000607 | ClawHub:automation-tool |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 62 | $0.000590 | ClawHub:afrexai-automation-strategy |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 401 | 94 | $0.000697 | ClawHub:ai-ceo-automation |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 80 | $0.000669 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation-1-0-0 |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 55 | $0.000548 | ClawHub:homelab-cluster |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 459 | 55 | $0.000587 | ClawHub:truenas-skill |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 425 | 116 | $0.000804 | ClawHub:homeserver |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 405 | 116 | $0.000788 | ClawHub:pi-admin |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 466 | 100 | $0.000773 | ClawHub:pi-health |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 409 | 65 | $0.000587 | ClawHub:trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 413 | 90 | $0.000690 | ClawHub:trading-devbox |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 73 | $0.000623 | ClawHub:trading-brain |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 60 | $0.000573 | ClawHub:openmm-grid-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 76 | $0.000632 | ClawHub:auto-trading-strategy |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 61 | $0.000585 | ClawHub:kalshi-cli-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 419 | 113 | $0.000787 | ClawHub:futu-trading-bot |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 110 | $0.000782 | ClawHub:finance-trading |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 61 | $0.000585 | ClawHub:trading-software-efficiency |
| claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 120 | $0.000823 | ClawHub:skill-trading-journal |