CLAWSTIN MORNING PAPER — 2026-03-24

Tuesday, 2026-03-24

TRADING DASHBOARD

TRADING P&L DASHBOARD — Daily target: $10/day
Track Today Total P&L Notes
📈 Agent Trader $+0.00 $-14.68 Swing, public.com
🎲 Polymarket — $-143.62 Structural arb, slow
Net (after tax + costs) $-0.10 vs $10 target: $-10.10

Cost breakdown: tax 37% short-term ($0.00) + token spend ($0.10/day) | Go-live trigger: 5 consecutive profitable weeks in paper trading

INNOVATIONS

RESEARCHER

Researcher Report — 2026-03-23

Run time: 2026-03-23 01:04 ET

Phase 1: Tech Research


Sources scanned: 578 items across HN + RSS feeds Candidates after scoring: 15 CBL evaluated: 15

EAT (queued to fridge)

- [EAT] Teaching Claude to QA a mobile app — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] Autonoma: A Hierarchical Multi-Agent Framework for End-to-End Workflow Automation — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] Claude Code Security and Magecart: Getting the Threat Model Right — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] ⚡ Weekly Recap: Chrome 0-Days, Router Botnets, AWS Breach, Rogue AI Agents & More — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] OpenClaw AI Agent Flaws Could Enable Prompt Injection and Data Exfiltration — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] A Subgoal-driven Framework for Improving Long-Horizon LLM Agents — _✅ queued_ - [EAT] Utility-Guided Agent Orchestration for Efficient LLM Tool Use — _✅ queued_

HOLD (notable but not fridged)

- [HOLD] TTQ: Activation-Aware Test-Time Quantization to Accelerate LLM Inference On The Fly — - [HOLD] PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Planning Abstractions for Cloud-Assisted LLM Agents — - [HOLD] Automated Membership Inference Attacks: Discovering MIA Signal Computations using LLM Agents — - [HOLD] A comprehensive study of LLM-based argument classification: from Llama through DeepSeek to GPT-5.2 — - [HOLD] CLaRE-ty Amid Chaos: Quantifying Representational Entanglement to Predict Ripple Effects in LLM Editing — - _(and 2 more HOLD items)_

Phase 2: PaperTrader Experiments


_No snapshot data available for today._

Phase 2 Errors

- ⚠️ No snapshot for today — cannot analyze performance

Phase 3: Optimization Analysis


> _Stale files and cron health are auditor territory (autoaudit). This phase covers cost and model routing only._

Cost Optimization Suggestions


- bizbot (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run - agent-trader-premarket (currently Opus): Evaluate if Sonnet or Haiku could handle this task — ~10-50x cost reduction per run

Cost Optimization Opportunities


- Opus referenced in 31 mentions across 29 sessions (39% of model refs) → Review Opus-heavy sessions — most tasks could run on Sonnet at ~10x lower cost _Up to ~10x on affected calls_


Phase 4: ClawHub Skill Scan



35 suspicious skill(s): - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with new publication date (2026-01-26), vague description lacking implementation details, requests broad network access (web search, crawling, LinkedIn) and filesystem permissions typical of MCP server tools, no visible source code repository linked, and the skill name "mcp-skill" is generic without specificity about which MCP server or tools are actually provided. - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-hass — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-10, 0 downloads), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access to Home Assistant instances (potential attack surface for credential exfiltration or lateral movement into smart home infrastructure). - [SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-plugin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-02), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests broad network access and process spawning capabilities ("execute tools from configured MCP servers"), (4) Description is agent-directed ("Enable AI agents to discover and execute"), (5) Vague implementation details about what "configured MCP servers" means and how they're validated. - [SUSPICIOUS] atlassian-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + new author + requires Docker process spawning + requests external network access (Jira API credentials) + vague implementation details with no visible source code repository linked. - [SUSPICIOUS] clickup-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-01-06), no visible source code repository link, requests OAuth authentication to external service (ClickUp), and the vague description lacks implementation details or security documentation typical of legitimate MCP skills. - [SUSPICIOUS] glin-profanity-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-01, author "thegdsks" appears to be first submission), no visible source code repository link provided, and the description is directed at AI agent use cases ("when AI needs content moderation capabilities") rather than describing the tool itself objectively. - [SUSPICIOUS] xiaohongshu-mcp-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-28), no visible source code repository linked, vague truncated description suggesting network/process access ("Operate Xiaohongshu via local MCP service"), and the skill requests interaction with an external social media platform which implies filesystem/network permissions outside a controlled workspace. - [SUSPICIOUS] mcp-client — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-22, author "nantes" with no history), no visible source code, vague description that doesn't specify what MCP endpoints/services it connects to, and the generic "connect to tools, data sources and services" phrasing lacks concrete implementation details needed for security assessment. - [SUSPICIOUS] wordpress-mcp — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-10), no visible source code repository linked, vague permission model for "any WordPress admin task", and requests network access to WordPress sites plus filesystem operations (media management, post creation) without transparent scope documentation.
Not relevant to active projects (mcp/automation contexts would need verified implementation details). - [SUSPICIOUS] openclaw-mcp-debugger — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-03-04), (2) No visible source code referenced, (3) Vague description cut off mid-sentence ("providing deep-..."), (4) Author handle "tmstudio667-commits" suggests automated/generic account creation, (5) Requests deep system diagnostics which typically require elevated permissions and network access.
Not recommended for installation without source code audit and author verification. - [SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: Zero downloads + newly published account (2026-02-06), no visible source code repository linked, vague implementation details for a complex skill, and description reads as agent instructions rather than technical documentation ("Use when identifying...", "Trigger on..."). - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with newly created account (2026-02-20), vague description lacking implementation details, requests broad permissions (multi-browser automation, filesystem access for form filling/scraping), and no visible source code available for inspection. - [SUSPICIOUS] automation-workflows-0-1-0 — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-07, author "lucasayala" with no visible reputation), no visible source code repository linked, and vague description that doesn't specify actual implementation details, permissions, or dependencies for the claimed automation tool integrations (Zapier, Make, n8n). - [SUSPICIOUS] agentic-workflow-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-26), vague/truncated description that doesn't fully explain functionality, author handle "0x-Professor" suggests minimal reputation/verification, no visible source code mentioned, and the skill name + description pattern (agentic workflow automation) combined with zero adoption suggests this could be a test payload or low-trust contribution.
Not recommended for integration without source code audit and author verification from ClawHub maintainers. - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-automation-workflows — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-05), vague description lacking implementation details, no visible source code repository link, and the description reads as capability statements rather than concrete documentation—typical of untrusted external content that could mask permission overreach or malicious behavior. - [SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-business-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-13), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description is directive language aimed at an AI agent ("Turn your AI agent into..." / "Design, document, implement...") rather than neutral documentation of what the skill does, (4) Vague implementation claims ("no n8n or Zapier required") without explaining the actual mechanism, (5) Author account "1kalin" with no verifiable history. - [SUSPICIOUS] automation-tool — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads from a newly created account (2026-03-08), vague description in Chinese offering "batch generation" without specifying implementation details, no visible source code, and the generic nature suggests potential for misuse in automated content manipulation or spam generation. - [SUSPICIOUS] afrexai-automation-strategy — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + brand new account (published 2026-02-19), vague description with truncation ("across any..."), no visible source code referenced, and the generic nature makes it impossible to assess what permissions or network access it actually requires. - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-ceo-automation — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new account with future publish date (2026), (2) Vague description lacking technical specifics about what "fully automated company operations" means, (3) No visible source code link, (4) Description reads as a directive to an AI agent rather than technical documentation, (5) Requests for permissions/capabilities unclear but implied scope is dangerously broad. - [SUSPICIOUS] ai-web-automation-1-0-0 — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) Requests network access and process spawning (Selenium/Puppeteer), (3) No visible source code repository linked, (4) Vague implementation details on retry/proxy handling, and (5) Description reads as a capability pitch rather than technical documentation. - [SUSPICIOUS] homelab-cluster — [SUSPICIOUS]
Zero downloads, newly published (2026-02-12), vague description lacking technical specifics, no visible source code, and requests infrastructure-level access (cluster management, health monitoring) that requires careful permission verification before deployment. - [SUSPICIOUS] truenas-skill — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: No visible source code, zero downloads with newly published account (2026-02-09), requests network access to external TrueNAS API, and vague implementation details without transparency on authentication/permission handling. - [SUSPICIOUS] homeserver — [SUSPICIOUS]
This skill exhibits multiple critical red flags: zero downloads with a very recent publish date (2026-02-23), no visible source code repository, vague truncated description ending in "ba..." suggesting incomplete information, requests for sensitive permissions (filesystem access, process spawning, network operations including port scanning), and the author account "Higangssh" appears to have minimal reputation history.
Project relevance: Matches "homelab" and "monitoring" keywords, but trustworthiness concerns override relevance. - [SUSPICIOUS] pi-admin — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + new/recent publication date, (2) No visible source code accessible for review, (3) Requests system-level access (resource monitoring, service management, updates) which requires elevated permissions and filesystem access outside typical workspace boundaries, (4) Author account "TheSethRose" appears to be a new publisher with no verifiable history.
This skill requests dangerous permissions (process spawning, system service control, package updates) that warrant manual code review before any consideration. - [SUSPICIOUS] pi-health — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-09, 0 downloads), no visible source code repository linked, and the skill requires spawning processes to read system files (`/sys/class/thermal`, `/proc/cpuinfo`, etc.) which poses execution risk without transparent code review.
If proceeding: Relevant to homelab/Raspberry Pi monitoring projects, but source code audit required before installation. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-02-12), no visible source code indicated, vague description lacking implementation details, and "trading" matches a keyword but the skill's actual utility and safety profile cannot be verified without source code inspection. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-devbox — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-25), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Description implies agent will execute arbitrary Python code generation ("agent writes a Python backtest strategy"), which creates code injection risk if user input isn't sanitized, (4) Requests execution capabilities that could spawn processes/filesystem access outside controlled sandbox. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-brain — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + new account (published 2026-02-27), vague description offering to "load" undefined personal trading strategy without visible source code, requests to "guide aggressive trades" suggests execution of financial decisions, and description reads as directive to an AI agent ("Load...to guide...trades"). - [SUSPICIOUS] openmm-grid-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags: Zero downloads + newly published (2026-02-25), no visible source code repository linked, vague technical description lacking implementation details, and "grid trading" strategies involve financial transactions requiring strict security validation that cannot be assured from metadata alone. - [SUSPICIOUS] auto-trading-strategy — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple critical red flags: zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-03-13), new/unfamiliar author account (863king), vague description lacking technical implementation details, requests for sensitive capabilities (trading strategy execution, market prediction), and the skill offers financial/trading guidance which could facilitate harmful activities if compromised. - [SUSPICIOUS] kalshi-cli-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags: zero downloads + new account (published 2026-03-04), vague description ending mid-sentence ("place..."), no visible source code, and requests network access to external trading platform plus likely process spawning for CLI tool execution. - [SUSPICIOUS] futu-trading-bot — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads + newly published account, (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests real financial market access and trade execution capabilities with HK market data, (4) Vague implementation details for a high-risk financial application, (5) Author account appears to use auto-generated naming pattern typical of throwaway accounts.
This skill involves real trading operations on live markets, which requires exceptionally high trust and transparency — neither of which this submission demonstrates. - [SUSPICIOUS] finance-trading — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags identified: (1) Zero downloads + newly published (2026-03-17), (2) No visible source code repository linked, (3) Requests network access (trading API calls) and likely filesystem access (trade logging), (4) Author "Brioche-bit" has no verifiable history, (5) Description lacks specifics on API integrations, data sources, or security model for handling credentials.
Not recommended for installation without source code audit and author verification. - [SUSPICIOUS] trading-software-efficiency — [SUSPICIOUS]
Multiple red flags present: zero downloads, newly published account (2026 date anomaly), vague description without visible source code or implementation details, and the skill requests unspecified "custom functionality" which could involve filesystem or process access for trading software integration. - [SUSPICIOUS] skill-trading-journal — [SUSPICIOUS]
Red flags present: (1) Zero downloads with very recent publication date (2026-03-17), (2) vague/truncated description that doesn't specify implementation details or permissions, (3) no visible source code repository linked, (4) trading journal skills typically require persistent filesystem access and network calls which should be explicitly declared but are not mentioned.
Not a clear fit for active projects listed (mcp, homelab, raspberry pi infrastructure focus), and the opaque nature of external financial tracking tools presents both security and functional reliability concerns without source code

Budget Summary


Total spent: $0.0280 / $5.00 cap API calls: 50 Tokens: 18801 input + 3231 output
| Model | Input | Output | Cost | Note | |-------|-------|--------|------|------| | claude-haiku-4-5 | 247 | 26 | $0.000302 | CBL:TTQ: Activation-Aware Test-Time Quan | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 244 | 26 | $0.000299 | CBL:PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Plannin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 243 | 21 | $0.000278 | CBL:Automated Membership Inference Attac | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 260 | 22 | $0.000296 | CBL:Teaching Claude to QA a mobile app | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 23 | $0.000290 | CBL:A comprehensive study of LLM-based a | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 254 | 24 | $0.000299 | CBL:CLaRE-ty Amid Chaos: Quantifying Rep | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 232 | 23 | $0.000278 | CBL:A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agen | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 242 | 25 | $0.000294 | CBL:Autonoma: A Hierarchical Multi-Agent | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 248 | 20 | $0.000278 | CBL:How Ceros Gives Security Teams Visib | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 249 | 21 | $0.000283 | CBL:Claude Code Security and Magecart: G | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 267 | 24 | $0.000310 | CBL:⚡ Weekly Recap: Chrome 0-Days, Route | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 257 | 23 | $0.000298 | CBL:OpenClaw AI Agent Flaws Could Enable | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 241 | 29 | $0.000309 | CBL:PowerLens: Taming LLM Agents for Saf | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 240 | 24 | $0.000288 | CBL:A Subgoal-driven Framework for Impro | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 237 | 22 | $0.000278 | CBL:Utility-Guided Agent Orchestration f | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 418 | 90 | $0.000694 | ClawHub:mcp-skill | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 407 | 74 | $0.000622 | ClawHub:mcp-hass | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 101 | $0.000753 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-plugin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 468 | 48 | $0.000566 | ClawHub:atlassian-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 60 | $0.000573 | ClawHub:clickup-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 450 | 75 | $0.000660 | ClawHub:glin-profanity-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 449 | 79 | $0.000675 | ClawHub:xiaohongshu-mcp-skill | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 404 | 84 | $0.000659 | ClawHub:mcp-client | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 476 | 82 | $0.000709 | ClawHub:wordpress-mcp | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 106 | $0.000766 | ClawHub:openclaw-mcp-debugger | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 495 | 64 | $0.000652 | ClawHub:automation-workflows | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 61 | $0.000580 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 506 | 79 | $0.000721 | ClawHub:automation-workflows-0-1-0 | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 112 | $0.000791 | ClawHub:agentic-workflow-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 420 | 71 | $0.000620 | ClawHub:ai-automation-workflows | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 439 | 116 | $0.000815 | ClawHub:afrexai-business-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 69 | $0.000607 | ClawHub:automation-tool | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 62 | $0.000590 | ClawHub:afrexai-automation-strategy | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 401 | 94 | $0.000697 | ClawHub:ai-ceo-automation | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 436 | 80 | $0.000669 | ClawHub:ai-web-automation-1-0-0 | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 55 | $0.000548 | ClawHub:homelab-cluster | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 459 | 55 | $0.000587 | ClawHub:truenas-skill | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 425 | 116 | $0.000804 | ClawHub:homeserver | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 405 | 116 | $0.000788 | ClawHub:pi-admin | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 466 | 100 | $0.000773 | ClawHub:pi-health | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 409 | 65 | $0.000587 | ClawHub:trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 413 | 90 | $0.000690 | ClawHub:trading-devbox | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 414 | 73 | $0.000623 | ClawHub:trading-brain | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 416 | 60 | $0.000573 | ClawHub:openmm-grid-trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 410 | 76 | $0.000632 | ClawHub:auto-trading-strategy | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 61 | $0.000585 | ClawHub:kalshi-cli-trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 419 | 113 | $0.000787 | ClawHub:futu-trading-bot | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 427 | 110 | $0.000782 | ClawHub:finance-trading | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 426 | 61 | $0.000585 | ClawHub:trading-software-efficiency | | claude-haiku-4-5 | 429 | 120 | $0.000823 | ClawHub:skill-trading-journal |

AUTO AUDIT RESULTS

AUTOAUDIT Summary -- 2026-03-24


Findings


CRITICAL


1. Cron `weekly-review` in error state — failed on 2026-03-23 with: "Channel is required when multiple channels are configured: telegram, signal. Set delivery.channel explicitly." The review itself completed and produced good output, but delivery failed. Fix: add `delivery.channel` to the cron job config.

WARNING


1. LaunchAgent `clawstin.papertrader` exit 127 — 3rd consecutive. Command not found (PATH issue in plist). Papertrader cron jobs work fine; this is the LaunchAgent-based runner that's broken.
2. AGENTS.md at 964 words (threshold: 400). Up from 861 last audit. Total injected+startup context: 1,598 words (over 1,500 threshold). AGENTS.md alone accounts for 60% of injected context. Swarm Canvas and Context Guard sections remain extraction candidates.
3. SCHEDULE.md has 5 unparseable entries (up from 4): - `July 15 — ski needs an STD test` — no year, inconsistent format. - `Justin +100 paycheck this coming week — SPW subsequent withdrawal (expense)` — no date. - `April 21 - Traffic Court in Ovid` — no year prefix (duplicate of properly-formatted 2026-04-14/20 reminder entries). - `Monday 3/23 9:00 AM — Time to pay Eason` — relative date, now past-due and ambiguous. - `Traffic court in Ithaca — April 22nd. Remind 1 week before...` — prose block, not a parseable schedule entry (duplicate of properly-formatted 2026-04-15/21 entries).
4. Bite-Sizer non-compliance — 23 workflow/action files with >3 inline steps and no step directory. Unchanged from last 2 audits. Workflows (6): BAR, BNT, BOOK, FIX, OPINV, REVIEW. Hellbot (1): HELL. Actions (16): BED, DIAG, EHUNT, EREAD, MADD, MDE, MEDIC, MGET, PFAIL, RE, SSA, ULP, WHAM, WHCI, WHINV, WHORD.
5. Blogwatcher: 540 unread items. Not urgent but indicates feeds are accumulating without consumption.

Carried Over


1. LaunchAgent `clawstin.papertrader` exit 127 — 3rd consecutive. PATH issue in plist. 2. Bite-Sizer non-compliance — 23 files, unchanged across 3 audits. 3. AGENTS.md over 400-word threshold — now 964 words (was 861). Growing. 4. SCHEDULE.md unparseable entries — now 5 (was 4).

Resolved Since Last Audit


- FER monitor plist — plist file deleted from disk. Fully resolved after 15 consecutive flags. - `com.clawstin.balance-notify` exit 1 — plist file deleted from disk. Resolved.

Past-Due Schedule Entries


- 2026-03-20 09:00 — Dentist appointment in 1 week (March 27 at 1pm) - 2026-03-19 09:00 — Ethernet cables arriving — set up Raspberry Pi print bridge + keepalive cron - 2026-03-23 14:00 — Pay Eason - flagged from morning brief - 2026-03-23 15:45 — Hound Ithaca City Court - 2026-03-23 17:00 — Meeting with Andy at 5pm

Fired One-Shot Reminders


None flagged by pre_audit.

Step Completion Checklist

Step 1 -- Pre-Audit Data: completed (13 checks; 0 errors, 2 warnings) Step 1.5 -- Smoke Tests: completed (11 pass, 1 warn: weekly-review cron error, 0 fail) Step 2 -- Last Report Review: completed (2 carried-over WARNINGs resolved: fer-monitor + balance-notify plists deleted; papertrader exit 127 persists; new CRITICAL: weekly-review delivery failure) Step 3 -- Daily Integration: completed (2026-03-23 log reviewed — 3 sessions; all referenced scripts verified: review_gather.py ✓, wacc_categorize.py ✓, ceo-meeting.py ✓, accounts_check_drift.py ✓, hord_machine.py ✓; no 2026-03-24 log yet as expected at 3AM) Step 4 -- Git Diff + Downstream: completed (4 commits reviewed; major: paper-trading project killed + moved to COMPLETE, skills-to-python closed, REVIEW/WACC scripts built, Book encryption + drift detection; no stale references found to old values) Step 5 -- File Health Review: completed (MEMORY.md 117w healthy; total context 1,598w OVER 1,500 threshold; AGENTS.md 964w over 400 single-file threshold; SCHEDULE.md 5 past-due + 5 unparseable) Step 6 -- Cron + Automation: completed (35 cron jobs reviewed; 1 error: weekly-review delivery channel missing; model assignments appropriate; LaunchAgents: 1 flagged — papertrader exit 127; vital-server, vitals-api, cloudflared running healthy) Step 7 -- Script Validation: completed (send-todo.sh ✓, triage-proton.py ✓, triage.py ✓ exists, watchdog/ ✓ 6 files present; no log errors found) Step 8 -- Cross-File Consistency: completed (23 bite-sizer non-compliant files unchanged; SCHEDULE.md duplicate entries for Traffic Court Ovid/Ithaca — prose + formatted versions coexist; no contradictions between injected files)

CAPABILITY QUEUE

PAPER TRADING

Model Portfolio Value P/L Cash Holdings
MACD+RSI $966.44 $-33.56 (-3.4%) $521.05 MSTR 1.1148sh @$134.55, CRM 0.7494sh @$196.89, GOOGL 0.4798sh @$308.14
Momentum EMA $993.01 $-6.99 (-0.7%) $993.01 Cash only
Rocket Rider $1159.43 +$159.43 (+15.9%) $1159.43 Cash only
News Sentiment $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sector Surfer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Earnings Stalker $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Fear Eater $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Unusual Volume $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Gap Trader $992.28 $-7.72 (-0.8%) $842.29 ADBE 0.6013sh @$249.44
Consolidation Bomber $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Trump Whisperer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Capitol Copycat $999.37 $-0.63 (-0.1%) $899.37 VST 0.6314sh @$158.38
Dual Momentum $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Squeeze Breakout N/A N/A N/A —
52wk High N/A N/A N/A —
Donchian Turtle $986.94 $-13.06 (-1.3%) $986.94 Cash only
Williams %R $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
KAMA Adaptive $964.97 $-35.03 (-3.5%) $378.16 GOOGL 0.4886sh @$307.35, CRM 0.7530sh @$196.89, WDAY 1.0466sh @$137.72, MSTR 1.0460sh @$137.90
Triple MA $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Insider Buyer $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Index Rider $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
FDA Catalyst $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sprint Rider $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Trend Reversion $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Sector Rotator $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Volume Breakout $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only
Dual Timeframe $1000.00 +$0.00 (+0.0%) $1000.00 Cash only

AGENT TRADER

Portfolio: $985.32 ($-14.68 / -1.5%)  |  Cash: $985.32  |  Trades: 4 (W:0 L:2 WR:0%)

Thesis (2026-03-23): [risk-off / ] Broad, correlated selloff across equities, bonds, and gold signals a liquidity-driven or forced-deleveraging event — cash is king today, and the only edge is relative strength longs if panic creates a reversal, or staying flat entirely.

Candidates: CRM (4⭐), NFLX (4⭐), AAPL (3⭐), AMD (1⭐)

No open positions.

POLYMARKET

Portfolio: $856.38 ($-143.62 / -14.4%)  |  Bankroll: $270.53  |  Open: 14 positions  |  Resolved: 24 (W:0 L:0)  |  Realized P&L: $-143.62
MarketSideEntryBetEnds
Weed rescheduled by June 30?YES0.170$66.662026-03-31
MegaETH market cap (FDV) >$6B one day after launch?YES0.017$53.332026-06-30
Netanyahu out by June 30?YES0.145$53.332026-12-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by March 31?YES0.030$42.672026-03-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by April 30?YES0.160$42.672026-03-31
Foreign intervention in Gaza by June 30?YES0.380$42.662026-03-31
Will Thomas Murphy be the Republican nominee for Senate in SYES0.003$34.132026-06-09
Weed rescheduled by December 31?YES0.473$34.132026-03-31
Will Israel launch a major ground offensive in Gaza by June YES0.130$27.312025-10-31
Will Israel launch a major ground offensive in Gaza by DecemYES0.310$27.302025-10-31
Will Russia capture Kostyantynivka by March 31?YES0.050$51.822026-03-31
Will Trump visit China by April 30?YES0.125$25.892026-04-30
Weed rescheduled by March 31?YES0.005$61.282026-03-31
Will GPT-6 be released by March 31, 2026?YES0.003$22.672025-12-31

SECURITY AUDIT

Security Guard Report — 2026-03-24


Run time: 2026-03-24 approximately 03:35 AM EDT AutoAudit verified: YES — autoaudit-latest.md dated 2026-03-24 confirmed Sandbox notes: lsof, ps aux, stat, cat, read_file allowed; fdesetup, pgrep, git, log show, find with -not syntax, grep -r with pipe redirect all blocked by allowlist External intel: No network access. All 5 configured sources return not_checked/sandbox_no_network_access. Researcher-latest.md (2026-03-23 run, 578 items) used as proxy threat intelligence.

Executive Summary


| Sev | ID | Title | Status | |-----|-----|-------|--------| | RESOLVED | SG-2026-03-23-001 | Gmail OAuth tokens world-readable | RESOLVED — all 3 now mode 600 | | 9 | SG-2026-03-21-001 | Third-party API credentials in git history | Carried over — unresolved | | 8 | SG-2026-03-24-001 | Lifeboat local ZIPs world-readable — 3 files (02AM cron) | NEW | | 7 | SG-2026-03-24-002 | clawstin-app-server all-interfaces binding port 8765 | NEW | | 6 | SG-2026-03-24-003 | ControlCenter AirPlay ports 7000 and 5000 all-interfaces | NEW (informational) | | 4 | SG-2026-03-24-004 | CREDENTIALS.md, LIFEBOAT.md, REMOTE-ACCESS.md world-readable | NEW (low) | | RESOLVED | SG-2026-03-23-002 | FER monitor plist 16th consecutive | RESOLVED per AutoAudit | | 2 | SG-2026-03-23-003 | balance-alert-pending.txt world-readable | Carried low |
Signal alerts: No new Severity 9-10 findings today. SG-2026-03-21-001 (Severity 9) was signaled 2026-03-21 and is not re-sent. SG-2026-03-24-001 is Severity 8 — morning brief only.

RESOLVED SINCE YESTERDAY


RESOLVED — SG-2026-03-23-001: Gmail OAuth Tokens World-Readable

Prior severity: 9 | Resolution confirmed: 2026-03-23 Session 1
All three Gmail OAuth token files confirmed mode 600 (-rw-------):
``` stat ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-adalsey.json -rw------- 1 aicomputer staff 721 Mar 22 11:15:48 2026 CORRECT
stat ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-krspamgang.json -rw------- 1 aicomputer staff 721 Mar 22 11:18:11 2026 CORRECT
stat ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-clawstinai.json -rw------- 1 aicomputer staff 695 Mar 10 10:31:14 2026 CORRECT
stat ~/.openclaw/gmail/credentials.json -rw------- 1 aicomputer staff 404 Feb 27 18:05:00 2026 CORRECT ```
Fix confirmed in 2026-03-23 daily log: "Gmail OAuth: chmod 600 on token writes, daily health check cron, GCP published to Production." Fully resolved.

RESOLVED — SG-2026-03-23-002: FER Monitor Plist

Per autoaudit-latest.md (2026-03-24): "FER monitor plist — plist file deleted from disk. Fully resolved after 15 consecutive flags." Not re-observed.

Detailed Findings — Active



SG-2026-03-21-001: Third-Party API Credentials in Git History

Severity: 9 — HIGH | Carried over from 2026-03-21 | Signal alert sent 2026-03-21 — not re-sent today
Description
API credentials for a third-party provider were committed to the workspace git repository. Files were removed from the working tree as of the 2026-03-23 sweep. Git history purge has NOT been verified as executed. Provider credential rotation status is unverifiable from this sandbox.
Evidence
- Files removed from working tree: confirmed 2026-03-23 - Git history purge: UNVERIFIED — git command blocked by sandbox allowlist - Provider credential rotation: UNVERIFIED — cannot query from sandbox
Impact
Any entity with access to git history (Google Drive rclone sync, VPS standby copies, any prior clone) may have retained these credentials. .git directory is readable by any aicomputer-context process — no privilege escalation required.
Rationale for Rating 9
"Plaintext credentials stored insecurely (not exposed externally but accessible locally without privilege)" per danger rubric. Rating maintained at 9 until both (a) history purge AND (b) provider rotation are confirmed.
Remediation Required (must be done in live Ghost session)
1. Check purge status: `git -C /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/workspace log --all --oneline -- path/to/file` 2. If not purged: `git filter-repo --path <file> --invert-paths` or BFG Repo Cleaner 3. Force-push to any remotes if applicable 4. Confirm with provider that old credential is revoked

SG-2026-03-24-001: Lifeboat Local ZIPs World-Readable (3 Files)

Severity: 8 — MEDIUM-HIGH | NEW | Not covered by accepted risk SG-2026-03-18-001
Description
Three lifeboat backup ZIP files in /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/lifeboat-local/ carry world-readable permissions (mode 644, -rw-r--r--). All three are from the 02:00 AM automated cron run. All other runs produce mode 600 correctly. Root cause: lifeboat-upload.sh does not chmod the local copy after creation — the cron process inherits umask 022, producing 644 instead of 600.
The ZIPs are password-protected (lifeboat_zip_password from Den). However: (1) world-readable permits any aicomputer-context process to copy and attempt offline password cracking; (2) the Den password is also accessible to any aicomputer-context process; (3) the ZIP contains all critical infrastructure credentials.
Evidence
``` ls -la /Users/aicomputer/.openclaw/lifeboat-local/
drwx------ aicomputer 384 Mar 24 02:02 . (directory: 700 CORRECT)
-rw-r--r-- aicomputer 244190116 Mar 22 02:02 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-020000.zip WORLD-READABLE -rw------- aicomputer 251809546 Mar 22 03:11 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-030740.zip OK -rw------- aicomputer 252406393 Mar 22 12:34 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-123203.zip OK -rw------- aicomputer 252702937 Mar 22 14:19 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-141753.zip OK -rw------- aicomputer 229224315 Mar 22 23:03 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-225158.zip OK -rw-r--r-- aicomputer 229410672 Mar 23 02:01 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-23-020003.zip WORLD-READABLE -rw------- aicomputer 230578450 Mar 23 15:21 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-23-151813.zip OK -rw------- aicomputer 232754896 Mar 23 22:53 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-23-224759.zip OK -rw------- aicomputer 232922465 Mar 23 23:53 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-23-235223.zip OK -rw-r--r-- aicomputer 233010150 Mar 24 02:02 clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-24-020003.zip WORLD-READABLE ```
Pattern: All three world-readable files are exactly from the 02:00 AM cron. All session-triggered runs produce 600.
Root cause confirmed in lifeboat-upload.sh code review (line ~145): ```bash cp -f "$ZIP_PATH" "$LOCAL_BACKUP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME"

No chmod 600 follows — cron umask 022 -> produces 644

```
ZIP contents (from lifeboat-upload.sh Step 1 review): - ~/.openclaw/creds.enc + Den Fernet key export - Gmail OAuth tokens x3 + credentials.json - ~/.cloudflared/ config.yml, credentials JSON, cert.pem (Cloudflare tunnel) - signal-cli data directory (account identity keys) - LaunchAgent plists (all clawstin. and ai.openclaw.) - ~/.config/rclone/rclone.conf (cloud storage auth) - ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Why SG-2026-03-18-001 Does Not Apply
SG-2026-03-18-001 accepted risk covers lifeboat-system/ staging files (mode 600 in 700 dir). These are the final assembled ZIP archives in lifeboat-local/ — a distinct path not addressed by that acceptance.
Rationale for Rating 8
"World-readable files containing system configuration" = Severity 8 per danger rubric. Downgraded from 9 because ZIP password provides partial mitigation. ZIP contents individually rate 9.
Remediation — One Line Fix
Add to lifeboat-upload.sh immediately after the cp line (~line 145): ```bash chmod 600 "$LOCAL_BACKUP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME" ``` Also manually chmod 600 the three existing world-readable files: - clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-22-020000.zip - clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-23-020003.zip - clawstin-lifeboat-2026-03-24-020003.zip

SG-2026-03-24-002: clawstin-app-server All-Interfaces Binding on Port 8765

Severity: 7 — MEDIUM | NEW
Description
Python process (PID 34703) listening on TCP *:8765 (all network interfaces). Runs from /Users/aicomputer/clawstin-app/server — outside the monitored workspace. The workspace copy of clawstin-app-server.py binds to 0.0.0.0 on port 8090; the running version is from a different directory using port 8765. Both use all-interfaces binding.
The server has Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication. Serves Anthropic balance estimates, TODO items, and SCHEDULE text.
Evidence
``` /usr/sbin/lsof -i -P -n | grep LISTEN: Python 34703 aicomputer 4u IPv4 TCP *:8765 (LISTEN)
/usr/sbin/lsof -p 34703 (cwd): Python 34703 aicomputer cwd DIR /Users/aicomputer/clawstin-app/server
workspace/scripts/clawstin-app-server.py: server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler) self.send_header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") PORT = 8090 (workspace copy — running process uses 8765) ```
Impact
Balance data, TODO items, SCHEDULE text exposed to all LAN and Tailscale hosts without auth. CORS wildcard allows any browser tab to read cross-origin. Not covered by accepted risk SG-2026-03-10-002 (that covers port 8877 static site only).
Rationale for Rating 7
Already bound to all interfaces serving operational data without authentication. Data is telemetry (balance, todos, schedule) not raw credentials.
Action Required
Ghost to confirm intent: Is port 8765 intentionally LAN/Tailscale-accessible for the iPhone app? - YES: formally accept this risk - NO: bind to 127.0.0.1 in /Users/aicomputer/clawstin-app/server

SG-2026-03-24-003: ControlCenter AirPlay Receiver — Ports 7000 and 5000 All Interfaces

Severity: 6 — LOW-MEDIUM | NEW (informational)
Standard macOS AirPlay Receiver behavior. ControlCenter (PID 34430) listening on :7000 and :5000 (IPv4 and IPv6). Not anomalous. Flagged as all-interfaces listeners per sweep protocol. LuLu firewall running provides inbound filtering.
``` ControlCe 34430 TCP *:7000 (LISTEN) IPv4 ControlCe 34430 TCP *:7000 (LISTEN) IPv6 ControlCe 34430 TCP *:5000 (LISTEN) IPv4 ControlCe 34430 TCP *:5000 (LISTEN) IPv6 ```
Remediation (optional): System Settings > General > AirDrop and Handoff > AirPlay Receiver > disable if not in use.

SG-2026-03-24-004: Operational Documentation Files World-Readable

Severity: 4 — LOW | NEW (defense-in-depth)
Several workspace doc files containing system architecture and credential location pointers are mode 644. No credential values in these files — they point to where credentials live.
``` workspace/CREDENTIALS.md -rw-r--r-- (Den key names, token paths) workspace/LIFEBOAT.md -rw-r--r-- (SSH commands, recovery steps) workspace/REMOTE-ACCESS.md -rw-r--r-- (Tailscale IP 100.112.26.36, SSH key path) workspace/RESTORE.md -rw-r--r-- (recovery procedures, config paths) workspace/BOOTSTRAP-NEW-MACHINE.md -rw-r--r-- (setup procedures) ```
Impact: roadmap to credential locations, not credential values. Actual credentials are in creds.enc (encrypted) or token files (mode 600). Defense-in-depth gap only.
Remediation (optional): chmod 600 on CREDENTIALS.md, REMOTE-ACCESS.md, LIFEBOAT.md, RESTORE.md. Verify OpenClaw session loading still works.

LuLu Firewall Status


RUNNING — both components confirmed: ``` ps aux | grep -i lulu: aicomputer 34719 /Applications/LuLu.app/Contents/MacOS/LuLu (started Fri 01PM) root 334 .../com.objective-see.lulu.extension.systemextension/... (running since Mar 16, ~8 days) ```
Log access blocked by sandbox (log show not in allowlist). No Lulu-related findings.

Network Exposure Summary


| Port | Process | Binding | Status | |------|---------|---------|--------| | 127.0.0.1:1025 | bridge SMTP | localhost | OK | | 127.0.0.1:1143 | bridge IMAP | localhost | OK | | *:5000 | ControlCenter AirPlay | all-ifaces | SG-2026-03-24-003 | | 127.0.0.1:5037 | adb | localhost | OK | | *:7000 | ControlCenter AirPlay | all-ifaces | SG-2026-03-24-003 | | *:8765 | Python clawstin-app | all-ifaces | SG-2026-03-24-002 NEW | | 127.0.0.1:8080 | java signal-cli | localhost | ACCEPTED RISK SG-2026-03-15-004 | | *:8877 | Python http.server | all-ifaces | ACCEPTED RISK SG-2026-03-10-002 | | 127.0.0.1:11434 | ollama | localhost | OK RESOLVED | | 127.0.0.1:18789 | node gateway | localhost | OK | | [::1]:18789 | node gateway | loopback IPv6 | OK | | 127.0.0.1:18791 | node | localhost | OK | | 127.0.0.1:18792 | node | localhost | OK | | 127.0.0.1:18800 | Brave CDP | localhost | ACCEPTED RISK SG-2026-03-15-006 | | 127.0.0.1:20241 | cloudflared | localhost | OK | | 127.0.0.1:65310 | bridge | localhost | OK |
Key change vs. 2026-03-23: Port 8765 is NEW — not previously observed.

Credential Scan


Direct stat checks on known credential files (grep-r blocked by sandbox):
``` ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-adalsey.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT (was 644 — FIXED) ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-krspamgang.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT (was 644 — FIXED) ~/.openclaw/gmail/token-clawstinai.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT (was 644 — FIXED) ~/.openclaw/gmail/credentials.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT ~/.openclaw/creds.enc -rw------- 600 CORRECT ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json.lastgood -rw------- 600 CORRECT (updated Mar 24 03:25) ~/.openclaw/rolodex.enc -rw------- 600 CORRECT ~/.openclaw/devices/paired.json -rw------- 600 CORRECT ~/.openclaw/lifeboat-local/ (dir) drwx------ 700 CORRECT 3 of 10 ZIPs inside -rw-r--r-- 644 SEE SG-2026-03-24-001 ```
No plaintext credential values found in accessible config/data files. Den (creds.enc) confirmed encrypted-at-rest.

Git Remote Check


Git command blocked by sandbox allowlist. Cannot verify remote config or history purge status. SG-2026-03-21-001 history remediation unverifiable from sandbox — requires live Ghost session.

External Threat Intelligence


No network access (sandbox constraint). All 5 sources unavailable.
Proxy intelligence from researcher-latest.md (2026-03-23, 578 items scanned):
1. THN Weekly Recap: "Chrome 0-Days, Router Botnets, AWS Breach, Rogue AI Agents" (queued EAT) Brave is Chromium-based. V8/renderer 0-days could affect CDP risk (SG-2026-03-15-006). Ghost should read. CVE details unavailable without network access.
2. "Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security" (arxiv 2603.19469) — Academic. Informational.
3. "Claude Code Security and Magecart" (THN 2026-03-23) — AI coding supply chain risk. Low current relevance.
4. OpenClaw advisory (THN 2026-03-15) — Already accepted as SG-2026-03-18-002.
Blogwatcher has 540 unread items (per AutoAudit). Security articles may be accumulating.

Risk Acceptance Cross-Reference


| Finding | Relevant Accepted Risk | Verdict | |---------|----------------------|---------| | Signal-CLI port 8080 | SG-2026-03-15-004 | Not flagged — matches | | Brave CDP port 18800 | SG-2026-03-15-006 | Not flagged — matches | | Python port 8877 static site | SG-2026-03-10-002 | Not flagged — matches | | lifeboat-system/ credentials | SG-2026-03-18-001 | Does NOT cover lifeboat-local/ ZIPs | | Chrome Remote Desktop | SG-2026-03-09-005 | Not flagged — matches | | OpenClaw advisory | SG-2026-03-18-002 | Not flagged — matches | | SG-2026-03-24-001 lifeboat ZIPs 644 | NONE | NEW — action required | | SG-2026-03-24-002 port 8765 | NONE | NEW — clarification needed |

Findings Disposition Table


| ID | Title | Today | |----|-------|-------| | SG-2026-03-23-001 | Gmail tokens world-readable | RESOLVED — all 3 confirmed mode 600 | | SG-2026-03-23-002 | FER plist 16th consecutive | RESOLVED — confirmed by AutoAudit 2026-03-24 | | SG-2026-03-23-003 | balance-alert-pending world-readable | Carried — sandbox blocked direct check | | SG-2026-03-21-001 | API credentials in git history | Carried — git blocked, unresolvable from sandbox | | SG-2026-03-21-002 | Ollama all-interfaces | Confirmed RESOLVED — 127.0.0.1:11434 again |

Security Guard sweep complete — 2026-03-24 Next run: 2026-03-25 (conditional on AutoAudit date match)